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Abstract
We establish a network formation game for the Internet’s Autonomous System (AS) interconnection
topology. The game includes different types of players, accounting for the heterogeneity of ASs in the
Internet. In this network formation game, the utility of a player depends on the network structure, e.g.,
the distances between nodes and the cost of links. We also consider the case where utility (or monetary)
transfers are allowed between the players. We incorporate reliability considerations in the player’s utility
function, and analyze static properties of the game as well as its dynamic evolution. We provide dynamic
analysis of topological quantities, and explain the prevalence of some “network motifs” in the Internet
graph. We assess our predictions with real-world data.
I. INTRODUCTION
The structure of communication networks, in particular that of the Internet, has carried much
interest. The Internet is a living example of a large, self organized, many-body complex system.
Understanding the processes that shape its topology would provide tools for engineering its
future.
The Internet is assembled out of multiple Autonomous Systems (ASs), which are contracted
by different economic agreements. These, in turn, compose the routing pathways among the
ASs. With some simplifications, we can represent the resulting network as a graph, where two
nodes (ASs) are connected by a link if traffic is allowed to traverse through them. The statistical
properties of this “Internet graph”, such as the clustering properties, degree distribution etc.,
have been thoroughly investigated ([1], [2], [3]) However, without proper understanding of the
mechanism that led to this structure, the statistical analysis alone lacks the ability to either predict
the future evolution of the Internet nor to shape its evolution.
A large class of models, a primary example is the “preferential attachment” model [4],
use probabilistic rules in order to simulate the network evolution and recover some of its
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2statistical properties, e.g., its degree distribution. Yet, these models fail to account for many
other features of the network [5]. Possibly, one of the main reasons for that is they treat the ASs
as passive elements rather than economic, profit-maximizing entities. An agent-based approach
is a promising alternative.
Game theory describes the behavior of interacting rational agents and the resulting equilibria,
and it is one of the main tools of the trade in estimating the performance of distributed algorithms
[6]. Game theory has been applied extensively to fundamental control tasks in communication
networks, such as flow control [7], network security [8], routing [9], and wireless network design
[10].
Recently, there has been increased activity in the field of network formation games. These
studies aim to understand the network structure that results from interactions between rational
agents ([11], [12]). Different authors emphasized different contexts, such as wireless networks
[13] or the inter-AS topology ([14], [15]). The theme of such research is to investigate the
equilibria’s properties, e.g., establishing their existence and obtaining bounds on the “price of
anarchy” and ”price of stability”. These metrics measure from above and below, correspondingly,
the social cost deterioration at an equilibrium compared with a (socially) optimal solution.
Alternatively, agent-based simulations are used in order to obtain statistical characteristics of
the resulting topology [16].
Nonetheless, the vast majority of these studies assume that the players are identical, whereas
the Internet is a heterogeneous mixture of various entities, such as CDNs, minor ISPs, tier-1 ASs
etc. There are only a few studies that have explicitly considered the effects of heterogeneity on
the network structure. Some examples include [15], which extends a previous model of formation
games for directed networks [11], and in the context of social networks, [17].
Most of the studies on the application of game theory to networks, with very few exceptions,
e.g., [18], focused on static properties of the game. This is particularly true for network formation
games. However, it is not clear that the Internet has reached an equilibrium. Indeed, ASs
continuously draw new contracts, some merge with others while other quit business. In fact, a
dynamic inspection of the inter-AS network suggests that the system may be far from equilibrium.
Therefore, a dynamic study of an inter-AS network formation game is needed.
In addition, previous work ignores an important requirement that Autonomous Systems has -
3reliability. Indeed, failures occur, and an AS must face such events. While some game theoretic
works addressed reliability in other contexts ([19], [20]), to the best of our knowledge, there are
no works that considered the topological properties that emerge in a heterogeneous, dynamic,
network formation game with reliability constraints.
We establish an analytically-tractable model, which explicitly accounts for the heterogeneity
of players as well as reliability requirements. We base our model on the heralded Fabrikant
model ([21], [22]). We model the inter-AS connectivity as a network formation game with
heterogeneous players that may share costs by monetary transfers. We account for the inherent
bilateral nature of the agreements between players, by noting that the establishment of a link
requires the agreement of both nodes at its ends, while removing a link can be done unilaterally.
As reliability comes into play, agents may require to be connected to other agents, or to all
the other agents in the network, by at least two disjoint paths. We investigate both the static
properties of the resulting game as well as its dynamic evolution.
Game theoretic analysis is dominantly employed as a “toy model” for contemplating about
real-world phenomena. It is rarely confronted with real-world data. In this study we go a step
further from traditional formal analysis, and we do consider real inter-AS topology data analysis
to support our theoretical findings.
The main contributions of this paper, which summarizes the findings in ([23], [24]), are as
follows:
• We evaluate static properties of the considered game, such as the prices of anarchy and
stability and characterize additional properties of the equilibrium topologies. We introduce
the concept of "price of reliability", which is defined as the ratio of the social cost with
reliability constraints to the social cost with no such additional constraints. Surprisingly,
we show that this price can be smaller than one, namely, that the additional reliability
requirements may increase the social utility.
• We discuss the dynamic evolution of the inter-AS network, and calculate convergence rates
and basins of attractions for the different final states. Our findings provide useful insight
towards incentive design schemes for achieving optimal configurations. Our model predicts
the possible evolvement of some early emerging minor players (say, regional ISPs) to a
major player, e.g., a tier-1 or tier-2 ASs, and the existence of a settlement-free clique, and
4that most of the other contracts between players include monetary transfers.
• We provide dynamical analysis of topological quantities, and explain the prevalence of some
“network motifs”, i.e., sub-graphs that appear frequently in the network. Through real-world
data, we provide encouraging support to our predictions.
In the next section, we describe our model. We discuss multiple variants, corresponding to
whether utility transfers (e.g., monetary transfers) are allowed or not, and whether reliability
constraints are in effect. In Section 3, we provide static analysis. Dynamic analysis is presented
in Section 4. In section 5 we compare our theoretical predictions with real-world data on inter-AS
topologies. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 6.
II. MODEL
We assume that each AS is a player. While there are many types of players, we aggregate
them into two types: major league (or type-A) players, such as major ISPs, central search engines
and the likes, and minor league (or type-B) players, such as local ISP or small enterprises. Each
player, regardless of its type, may form contracts with other players, and should they reach a
mutual understanding, a link between them is formed. A player’s strategy is set by specifying
which links it is interested in establishing, and, if permissible, the price it will be willing to pay
for each.
We denote the set of type-A (type B) player by TA (TB). A link connecting node i to node j
is denoted as either (i, j) or ij. The total number of players is N = |TA|+ |TB|, and we assume
N ≥ 3. The shortest distance between nodes i and j is the minimal number of hops along a path
connecting them and is denoted by d(i, j). Finally, the degree of node i is denoted by deg(i)
and the connected component of i, given the set of links E, is Γ(i). .
A. Basic model
Our cost function is based on the cost structure in [21] and [22]. Players are penalized for their
distance from other players. First and foremost, players require a good, fast connection to the
major players, while they may relax their connection requirements to minor players. Bandwidth
usage and delay depends heavily on the hop distance, and connection quality is represented by
this metric. We weight the relative importance of a major player by a factor A > 1 in the cost
function in the corresponding distance term. The link prices represent factors such as the link’s
5maintenance costs, bandwidth allocation costs etc. Different player types may incur different
link costs, cA, cB, due to varying financial resources or infrastructure. Formally, the (dis-)utility
of players is represented as follows.
Definition 1. (basic mode) The cost function, C(bare)β (i), of node i of type β ∈ {A,B}, is defined
as:
C
(bare)
β (i) , deg(i) · cβ + A
∑
j∈TA
d(i, j) +
∑
j∈TB
d(i, j)
where A > 1 represents the relative importance of class A nodes over class B nodes. Then,
the social cost is defined as S = ∑iC(i).
Set c , (cA + cB) /2. We assume cA ≤ cB. The optimal (minimal) social cost is denoted as
S(bare)optimal (for brevity, Soptimal).
We denote the the social cost at the optimal stable solution as S˜optimal. The price of stability is
the ratio between the social cost at the best stable solution and its value at the optimal solution,
namely PoS = S˜optimal/Soptimal. Similarly, denote by S˜pessimal the highest social cost in an
equilibrium. Then, the price of anarchy is the ratio between the social cost at the worst stable
solution and its value at the optimal solution, namely PoA = S˜pessimal/Soptimal.
We denote the change in cost of player i as after the addition (removal) of a link (j, k) by
∆C(i, E + jk) , C (i, E ∪ (j, k))− C (i, E). The establishment of a link requires the bilateral
agreement of the two parties at its ends, while removing a link can be done unilaterally. This is
known as a pairwise-stable equilibrium [12], [18].
Definition 2. The players’ strategies are pairwise-stable if for all i, j ∈ TA ∪ TB, the following
hold:
a) if ij ∈ E, then ∆C(i, E − ij) > 0;
b) if ij /∈ E, then either ∆C(i, E + ij) > 0 or ∆C(j, E + ij) > 0.
The resulting graph is referred to as a stabilizable graph.
In many cases, ASs must maintain access to the Internet in case of a single link failure. This
is tantamount to the requirement that all the players must have at least two link disjoint paths
to each other node. If survivability constraints are in effect, we generalize the basic model by
modifying the distance term in the cost function, and adding a term representing the distance
6along the backup path. Nevertheless, if either link prices are high, crash frequencies are low or
the content of a minor AS is of little value, players may relax their reliability requirements and
demand the establishment of disjoint paths only to the major players. This is represented by a
binary parameter τ , which is set to one if two disjoint paths are required to all nodes, and zero
if the reliability requirement holds for major players only.
The relative weight of the primary path and the backup path is set by the parameter δ. If
failures are often, then the regular and backup paths (in the corresponding pair of link-disjoint
paths) are used almost as frequently. As such, they must be weighted the same in the cost
function. In this case, the likelihood of using either route is the same, and δ = 1. Conversely,
if failures are rare, traffic will be mostly carried across the shorter path. Therefore, its length
should carry more weight in the cost than the length of the backup route, hence δ  1.
Definition 3. (cost function under survivability constraints) The cost function, C(reliable)β (i), of
node i
C
(reliable)
β (i) , deg(i) · cβ +
A
1 + δ
∑
j∈TA
(d(i, j) + δd′(i, j))
+τ · 1
1 + δ
∑
j∈TB
(d(i, j) + δd′(i, j)) + (1− τ)
∑
j∈TB
d(i, j)
where d(i, j) and d′(i, j) are the lengths of a pair of paths between i, j that minimizes the
cost function. d(i, j) denotes the length of the shorter path. Formally, denote a pair of disjoint
paths connecting player i and player j as
(
R(i,j), R
′
(i,j)
)
α
, where dα(i, j) (d′α(i, j)) is the length
of shorter (correspondingly, longer) path. Set
(
Rˆ(i,j), Rˆ′(i,j)
)
= arg min(
R(i,j),R
′
(i,j)
)
α
Cβ(i)
then d(i, j) =
∥∥∥Rˆ(i,j)∥∥∥ and d′(i, j) = ∥∥∥Rˆ′(i,j)∥∥∥.
We denote the change in cost of player i as after the addition (removal) of a link (j, k) by
∆C(i, E+jk) , C (i, E ∪ (j, k))−C (i, E) (correspondingly, ∆C(i, E−jk) , C (i, E \ (j, k))−
C (i, E)). The abbreviation ∆C(i, jk) is often used.
If δ = 1, then the two routing pathways are used the same. In this case, the shortest cycle
length d(i, j)+d′(i, j) is the relevant quantity that appears in the cost function. This can be found
7in polynomial time by Suurballe’s algorithm ([25], [26]). However, if δ  1, routing will occur
along two disjoint paths, such that the length of the shortest between the two is shortest (among
all pairs of disjoint paths). Although the complexity of finding this pair is NP-Hard, first finding
the shortest path and then finding the next shortest path is a heuristic that works remarkably well,
both in the real-world data analysis and on the networks obtained in the theoretical discussion.
The reason behind this is that, when failures are rare, information is predominantly routed along
the shortest path. When players are required to establish a fall-back route, they will establish a
path that is disjoint from the current routing path, namely the shortest one.
The additional reliability requirements result in additional link expenses, as for example, the
degree of every node needs to be at least two. The price of reliability is the ratio between the
optimal social cost under the additional survivability constraint to the optimal social cost when
the additional constraints are removed.
Definition 4. The price of reliability (PoR) is the ratio between the optimal value of the social
costs among the set of corresponding stable equilibria, PoR = S˜optimal/S˜
(bare)
optimal.
Surprisingly, we shall show that there exist scenarios in which reliability requirements increase
the social utility, so that the price of reliability can be smaller than one.
B. Utility transfer
In the above formulation, we have implicitly assumed that players may not transfer utilities.
However, often players are able to do so, in particular via monetary transfers. We incorporate
such possibility by introducing an extended model, allowing for a monetary transaction in which
player i pays player j some amount Pij iff the link (i.j) is established. Player j sets some
minimal price wij and if Pij ≥ wij the link is formed. The corresponding change to the cost
function is as follows.
Definition 5. The cost function of player i when monetary transfers are allowed is C˜(i) ,
C(i) +
∑
j,ij∈E (Pij − Pji).
In this definition the cost C(i) may be either C(reliable)(i) or C(bare)(i).
Note that the social cost remains the same as in Def. 5 as monetary transfers are canceled by
summation.
8Monetary transfers allow the sharing of costs. Without transfers, a link will be established only
if both parties, i and j, reduce their costs, C(i, E + ij) < 0 and C(j, E + ij) < 0. Consider, for
example, a configuration where ∆C(i, E+ ij) < 0 and ∆C(j, E+ ij) > 0. It may be beneficial
for player i to offer a lump sum Pij to player j if the latter agrees to establish (i, j). This will
be feasible only if the cost function of both players is reduced. It immediately follows that if
∆C(i, E+ij)+∆C(i, E+ij) < 0 then there is a value Pij such that this condition is met. Hence,
it is beneficial for both players to establish a link between them. In a game theoretic formalism,
if the core of the two players game is non-empty, then they may pick a value out of this set as
the transfer amount. Likewise, if the core is empty, or ∆C(i, E+ ij) + ∆C(j, E+ ij) > 0, then
the best response of at least one of the players is to remove the link, and the other player has
no incentive to offer a payment high enough to change the its decision. Formally:
Corollary 6. When monetary transfers are allowed, the link (i, j) is established iff ∆C(i, E +
ij) + ∆C(j, E + ij) < 0. The link is removed iff ∆C(i, E − ij) + ∆C(j, E − ij) > 0.
In the remainder of the paper, whenever monetary transfers are feasible, we will state it
explicitly, otherwise the basic model (without transfers or survivability constraints) is assumed.
III. STATIC ANALYSIS
In this section we discuss the properties of stable equilibria. Specifically, we first establish
that, under certain conditions, the major players group together in a clique (section III-A). We
shall further discuss topological properties that emerge from our analysis (section III-B).
As a metric for the quality of the solution we apply the commonly used measure of the social
cost, which is the sum of individual costs. We evaluate the price of anarchy, which is the ratio
between the social cost at the worst stable solution and its value at the optimal solution, and
the price of stability, which is the ratio between the social cost at the best stable solution and
its value at the optimal solution (section III-C). We introduce utility transfers in section III-D,
and consider the impact of survivability requirements on the prices of stability and anarchy in
section III-E.
A. The type-A clique
Our goal is understanding the resulting topology when we assume strategic players and myopic
dynamics. Obviously, if the link’s cost is extremely low, every player would establish links with
9all other players [21]. The resulting graph will be a clique. This is not a realistic setting.
If two nodes are at a distance L+1 of each other, then there is a path with L nodes connecting
them. By establishing a link with cost c, we are shortening the distance between the end node
to ∼ L/2 nodes that lay on the other side of the line. The average reduction in distance is also
≈ L/2, so by comparing L2 ≈ 4c we obtain a bound on L, as follows:
Lemma 7. The longest distance between any node i and node j ∈ TB is bounded by 2√cB.
The longest distance between nodes i, j ∈ TA is bounded by
√
(1− 2A)2 + 4cA− 2 (A− 1). In
addition, if cA < A then there is a link between every two type-A nodes.
Proof: Assume d(i, j) = k − 1 ≥ ⌊2√cB⌋ > 1 and i ∈ TB. Then there exist nodes
(x1 = i, x2, ..xk = j) such that d(i, xα+1) = α. By adding a link (i, j) the change in cost of
node i, ∆C(i, E + ij) is, according to lemma 41 in the appendix,
∆C(i, E + ij)
=cB −
k−1∑
α=1
d(i, xk)(1 + δxα,A(A− 1))
+
k−1∑
α=1
d′(i, xα)(1 + δxα,A(A− 1))
=cB −
k−1∑
α=1
(d(i, xα)− d′(i, xα)) (1 + δxα,A(A− 1))
<cB −
k−1∑
α=1
d(i, xα) +
k−1∑
α=1
d′(i, xα)
<cB − k (k − 2) +mod(k, 2)
4
<cB − k (k − 2)
4
< 0
where d′(i, xα) < d(i, xα) is the distance after the addition of the link (i, j) and δxα,A = 1 iff
xα ∈ TA. Therefore, it is of the interest of player i to add the link.
Consider the case that j ∈ TA and
d(i, j) = k − 1 ≥
√
(1− 2A)2 + 4cB − 2 (A− 1) > 1 (1)
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The change in cost after the addition of the link (i, j) is
cB −
k−1∑
α=1
d(i, xα)(1 + δxα,A(A− 1))
+
k−1∑
α=1
d′(i, xα)(1 + δxα,A(A− 1))
=cB −
k−1∑
α=1
(d(i, xα)− d′(i, xα)) (1 + δxα,A(A− 1))
<cB −
k−2∑
α=1
d(i, xα) +
k−2∑
α=1
d′(i, xα) + A (d(i, xk)− d′(i, xk))
<cB − k (k − 2) +mod(k − 1, 2)
4
− (k − 1)A
+ (k − 1) + A− 1
<cB − k (k − 2)
4
− (A− 1) (k − 2)
=cB − k2/4− k(A− 1)
<0
Therefore it is beneficial for player i to establish the link. Similarly, if i ∈ TA then eq. 1 is
replaced by k − 1 ≥√(1− 2A)2 + 4cA − 2 (A− 1) > 1.
In particular, if we do not omit the mod(k − 1, 2) term and set k = 3 we get that if
2
√
(−1 + A)A+ cA − 2(A− 1) < 2 the distance between two type-A nodes is smaller than 2,
in other words, they connected by a link. The latter expression can be recast to the simple form
c < A.
Recall that if the cost of both parties is reduced (the change of cost of node j is obtained
by the change of summation to 0..k − 1) a link connecting them will be formed. Therefore, if
i, j ∈ TB then maximal distance between then is d(i, j) ≤ max{2√cB, 1} as otherwise it would
be beneficial for both i, j to establish a link that will reduce their mutual distance to 1. Likewise,
if i, j ∈ TA then
d(i, j) ≤
√
(1− 2A)2 + 4cA − 2 (A− 1)
using an analogous reasoning. If i ∈ TA and j ∈ TB then it’ll be worthy for player i to establish
the link only if d(i, j) ≥ ⌊2√cB⌋. In this case it’ll be also worthy for player j to establish the
11
Figure 1. Non optimal networks. The type-A clique is in blue squares, the type-B players are in red circles. a) The network
described in Example 8. b) A poor equilibrium, as described in [29].
link since
d(i, j) ≥ b2√cBc ≥
√
(1− 2A)2 + 4cB − 2 (A− 1)
and the link will be established. Notice however that if
b2√cBc ≥ d(i, j) ≥
√
(1− 2A)2 + 4cA − 2 (A− 1)
then although it is worthy for player j to establish the link, it is isn’t worthy for player i to do
so and the link won’t be established. This concludes our proof.
Lemma 7 indicates that if 1 < cA < A then the type A nodes will form a clique (the
“nucleolus” of the network). The type B nodes form structures that are connected to the type A
clique (the network nucleolus). These structures are not necessarily trees and will not necessarily
connect to a single point of the type-A clique only. This is indeed a very realistic scenario,
found in many configurations. We shall compare this result to actual data on the inter-AS
interconnection topology in section V.
If c > A then the type-A clique is no longer stable. This setting does not correspond to the
observed nature of the AS topology and we’ll focus in all the following sections on the case
1 < cA < A.
B. Equilibria’s properties
Here we describe common properties of all pair-wise equilibria. We start by noting that, unlike
the findings of several other studies [18], [27], [28], in our model, at equilibrium, the type-B
nodes are not necessarily organized in trees. This is shown in the next example.
Example 8. Assume for simplicity that cA = cB = c. Consider a line of length k of type B
nodes, (1, 2, 3..., k) such that
√
8c > k + 1 >
√
2c or equivalently (k + 1)2 < 8c < 4 (k + 1)2.
In addition, the links (j1, 1) and (j2, k) exist, where j1, j2 ∈ TA, i.e., the line is connected at
12
Figure 2. A line of k = 7 nodes. By removing the link (1, 2) only the distances from player 1 to the yellow players are
affected. By establishing the link (j, 4) only the distances from player j′ to the players encircled by the purple dashed ellipse
are affected.
both ends to different nodes of the type-A clique, as depicted in Fig 1. In [29] we show that
this is a stabilizable graph.
Proof: We show that this structure is stabilizable. For simplicity, assume mod(k−1, 4) = 0
(k is odd and k−1
2
is odd).
Any link removal (x1, x2) in the circle (j1, 1...k, j2, j1) will result in a line with nodes x1
and x2 at its ends (Fig. 2). We now show that if it beneficial for player i to remove the edge
(i, i− 1) for i ≤ ⌈k
2
⌉
, then it is also true that it is beneficial for node i− 1 to remove the edge
(i−1, i−2). For player i, the removal of the edge (i, i−1) affects only the distance to the other
players on the loop. This is also true for node i− 1 and the removal of the edge (i− 1, i− 2).
Denote the distances after the removal of the edge (i, i − 1) by di (·, ·). A simple geometrical
observation shows that
d (i, y)− di (i, y) ≥ d (i− 1, y)− di−1 (i− 1, y)
for every y = 1...k. In other words, the increase in the distance cost for node i after the
removal of (i, i− 1) is greater than the additional distance cost of player i− 1 after the removal
of the edge (i−1, i−2). Therefore, the type-B players that have the most incentive to disconnect
a link are either node 1 or node k ( Fig. 2). Therefore, if players 1 or k would not deviate, no
type-B player will deviate as well.
W.l.o.g, we discuss node 1. Since cB < A, it is not beneficial for it to disconnect the link
(j1, 1). Assume the link (1, 2) is removed. A simple geometric observation shows that the distance
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to nodes {2, .., k+3
2
} is affected, while the distance to all the other nodes remains intact (Fig. 2).
The mean increase in distance is k+1
2
and the number of affected nodes is k+1
2
. However,
∆C(1, E − 12) = c− (k + 1)
2
2
< 0
and player 1 would prefer the link to remain. The same calculation shows that it is not beneficial
for player j1 to disconnect (j1, 1).
Clearly, if it not beneficial for j ∈ TA, j 6= j1, j2 to establish an additional link to a type-
B player then it is not beneficial to do so for j1 or j2 as well. The optimal additional link
connecting j and a type-B player is E = (j, k+1
2
), that is, a link to the middle of the ring (Fig.
2). A similar geometric observation shows that by establishing this link, only the distances to
nodes
{
k−1
4
, ..., 3k+1
4
}
are affected (Fig. 2). The reduction in cost is
∆C(j, E + E) = c− (k + 1)
8
2
> 0
and it is not beneficial to establish the link.
In order to complete the proof, we need to show that no additional type-B to type-B links
will be formed. By establishing such link, the distance of at least one of the parties to the type-
A clique is unaffected. The previous calculation shows that by adding such link the maximal
reduction of cost due to shortening the distance to type-B players is bounded from above by
(k+1)
8
2
. Therefore, as before, no additional type-B to type-B links will be formed.
This completes the proof that this structure is stabilizable.
Next, we bound from below the number of equilibria. For simplicity, we discuss the case
where cA = cB = c. We accomplish that by considering the number of equilibria where the
type-B players are organized in a forest (multiple trees) and the allowed forest topologies. The
following lemma restricts the possible sets of trees in an equilibrium. Intuitively, this lemma
states that we can not have two “heavy” trees, “heavy” meaning that there is a deep sub-tree
with many nodes, as it would be beneficial to make a shortcut between the two sub-trees.
Lemma 9. Assume cA = cB = c. Consider the BFS tree formed starting from node i. Assume
that node j is k levels deep in this tree. Denote the sub-tree of node j in this tree by Ti(j) (Fig.
3) In a link stable equilibrium, the number of nodes in sub-trees satisfy either |Ti(j)| < c/k or
14
Figure 3. Node j is on the third level of the tree of formed by starting a BFS from node i, as discussed in lemma 9. The
forest of type-B nodes is composed of two trees, in yellow and red (lemma 10). Their roots are i and j, correspondingly. The
maximal depth in this forest is three.
|Tj(i)| < c/k.
Proof: Assume |Ti(j)| > c/k. Consider the change in cost of player i after the addition of
the link (i, j)
∆C(i, E + ij)
= c+
∑
xα∈T i(j)
d′(i, xα)(1 + δxα,A(A− 1))
+
∑
xα /∈Ti(j)
d′(i, xα)(1 + δxα,A(A− 1))
−
∑
xα∈Ti(j)
d(i, xα)(1 + δxα,A(A− 1))
−
∑
xα /∈Ti(j)
d(i, xα)(1 + δxα,A(A− 1))
= c+
∑
xα∈Ti(j)
(d′(i, xα)− d(i, xα)) (1 + δxα,A(A− 1))
+
∑
xα /∈Ti(j)
(d′(i, xα)− d(i, xα)) (1 + δxα,A(A− 1))
< c+
∑
xα∈Ti(j)
(d′(i, xα)− d(i, xα))
= c− k|Ti(j, k)|
< 0
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since the distance was shorten by k for every node in the sub-tree of j.
Therefore, it is beneficial for player i to establish the link. Likewise, if |Tj(i)| < c/k then it
would be beneficial for player j to establish the link and the link will be established. Hence,
one of the conditions must be violated.
The following lemma considers the structure of the type-B players’ sub-graph. It builds on
the results of lemma 9 to reinforce the restrictions on trees, showing that trees must be shallow
and small.
Lemma 10. Assume cA = cB = c. If the sub-graph of type-B nodes is a forest (Fig. 3), then there
is at most one tree with depth greater than
√
c/2 and there is at most one tree with more than
c/2 nodes. The maximal depth of a tree in the forest is
√
2c − 1. Every type-B forest in which
every tree has a maximal depth of min
{√
c/2,
√
c− 3
}
and at most min {c/2,√c} nodes is
stabilizable.
Proof: Assume there are two trees S1, S2 that have depth greater than
√
c/2 . The distance
between the nodes at the lowest level is greater than 2
√
c/2 + 1 as the trees are connected by
at least one node in the type-A clique, d(i, j) ≥ 2 (Fig. 3). This contradicts with Lemma 7.
Assume there are two trees S1, S2 with roots i, j that have more than c/2 nodes. In the BFS
tree in which node i is the root, node j is at least in the second level (as they are connected by
at least one node in the type-A clique). This contradicts with Lemma 9.
Finally, following the footsteps of Lemma 9 proof, consider two trees Ti and Tj , with corre-
sponding roots i and j (i.e., nodes i and j have a direct link with the type-A clique). Consider
a link (x, y), where x ∈ Ti and y ∈ Tj . At least one of them does not reduce its distance to the
type-A clique by establishing this link. W.l.o.g, we’ll assume this is true for player x. Therefore,
∆C(x,E + xy)
= c+
∑
z∈Tj
(d′(z, x)− d(z, x))
> 0
as the maximal reduction in distance is
√
c and the maximal number of nodes in Tj is also
√
c.
Therefore, it is not beneficial for player x to establish this link, and the proof is completed.
Finally, the next proposition provides a lower bound on the number of link-stable equilibria
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by a product of |TA| and a polynomial with a high degree (≈ 2
√
c) in |TB|.
Proposition 11. Assume cA = cB = c. The number of link-stable equilibria in which the sub-
graph of TB is a forest is at least ω(|TA||TB|Nc), where Nc = o(2
√
c
2 /
√
c) is a function of c only.
Therefore, the number of link-stable equilibria is at least o(|TA||TB|Nc).
Proof: We bound the number of link-stable equilibria from below by considering the number
of link-stable graph, in which the minor players are organized in trees of up to depth
√
c/2 and
exactly
√
c nodes.
The number of such trees can be bounded from below by the number of trees with
√
c
elements, depth
√
c/2 and only one non-leaf node at each level of tree, which is
NC ≥
 b√cc⌊√
c/2
⌋
 ∈ ω(2√c2 /√c)
Therefore, the minor players can be organized in at least
 |TB|+Nc
Nc
 different configura-
tions. Using Striling’s approximation, we have
 |TB|+Nc
Nc
 ∈ ω(|TB|Nc). Each tree can be
connected to either one of the type-A nodes, and therefore the number of possible configurations
is at least ω(|TA||TB|Nc) .
To sum up, while there are many equilibria, in all of them nodes cannot be too far apart,
i.e., a small-world property. Furthermore, the trees formed are shallow and are not composed of
many nodes.
C. Price of Anarchy & Price of Stability
As there are many possible link-stable equilibria, a discussion of the price of anarchy is
in place. First, we explicitly find the optimal configuration. Although we establish a general
expression for this configuration, it is worthy to also consider the limiting case of a large network,
|TB|  1, |TA|  1. Moreover, typically, the number of major league players is much smaller
than the other players, hence we also consider the limit |TB|  |TA|  1.
Proposition 12. Consider the network where the type B nodes are connected to a specific node
17
Figure 4. The optimal solution, as described in Lemma 12. If (A+ 1) /2 < c the optimal solution is described by a), otherwise
by b). When monetary transfers (section III-D) are allowed, both configurations are stabilizable. Otherwise, only a) is stabilizable.
j ∈ TA of the type-A clique. The social cost in this stabilizable network (Fig. ??(a)) is
S = 2|TB| (|TB| − 1 + c+ (A+ 1) (|TA| − 1/2)) + |TA| (|TA| − 1) (cA + A) .
Furthermore, if |TB|  1, |TA|  1 then, omitting linear terms in |TB|, |TA|,
S = 2|TB|(|TB|+ (A+ 1) |TA|) + |TA|2 (c+ A) .
Moreover, if A+1
2
≤ c then this network structure is socially optimal and the price of stability is
1, otherwise the price of stability is
PoS =
2|TB|(|TB|+ (A+ 1) |TA|) + |TA|2 (cA + A)
2|TB|
(|TB|+ (A+12 + c) |TA|)+ |TA|2 (cA + A) .
Finally, if |TB|  |TA|  1, then the price of stability is asymptotically 1.
Proof: This structure is immune to removal of links as a disconnection of a (type−B, type−
A) link will disconnect the type-B node, and the type-A clique is stable (lemma 7). For every
player j and i ∈ TB, any additional link (i, j) will result in ∆C(j, E + ij) ≥ cB − 1 > 0 since
the link only reduces the distance d(i, j) from 2 to 1. Hence, player j has no incentive to accept
this link and no additional links will be formed. This concludes the stability proof.
We now turn to discuss the optimality of this network structure. First, consider a set of type-A
players. Every link reduce the distance of at least two nodes by at least one, hence the social
cost change by introducing a link is negative, since 2cA − 2A < 0. Therefore, in any optimal
configuration the type-A nodes form a complete graph. The other terms in the social cost are due
to the inter-connectivity of type-B nodes and the type-A to type-B connections. As deg(i) = 1
for all i ∈ TB the cost due to link’s prices is minimal. Furthermore, d(i, j) = 1 and the distance
cost to node j (of type A) is minimal as well. For all other nodes j′, d(i, j′) = 2.
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Assume this configuration is not optimal. Then there is a topologically different configuration
in which there exists an additional node j′ ∈ TA for which d(i, j′) = 1 for some i ∈ TB. Hence,
there’s an additional link (i, j). The social cost change is 2c+ 1 +A . Therefore, if A+1
2
≤ c this
link reduces the social cost. On the other hand, if A+1
2
> c every link connecting a type-B player
to a type-A player improves the social cost, although the previous discussion show these link are
unstable. In this case, the optimal configuration is where all type-B nodes are connected to all
the type-A players, but there are no links linking type-B players. This concludes the optimality
proof.
The cost due to inter-connectivity of type A nodes is
cA|TA| (|TA| − 1) + A|TA| (|TA| − 1) = |TA| (|TA| − 1) (cA + A) .
The first expression is due to the cost of |TA| clique’s links and the second is due to distance
(=1) between each type-A node. The distance of each type B nodes to all the other nodes is
exactly 2, except to node j, to which its distance is 1. Therefore the social cost due to type B
nodes is
2|TB|(|TB| − 1) + 2cB|TB|+ 2 (A+ 1) |TB| ((|TA| − 1) + (A+ 1) + 2 (A+ 1) (|TA| − 1))
=2|TB| (|TB| − 1 + cB + (A+ 1) (|TA| − 1/2)) .
The terms on the left hand side are due to (from left to right) the distance between nodes of
type B, the cost of each type-B’s single link, the cost of type-B nodes due to the distance (=2)
to all member of the type-A clique bar j and the cost of type B nodes due to the distance (=1)
to node j. The social cost is
∑
C(i) = 2|TB| (|TB| − 1 + c+ (A+ 1) (|TA| − 1/2)) + |TA| (|TA| − 1) (cA + A) .
To complete the proof, note that if A+1
2
> c the latter term in the social cost of the optimal
(and unstable) solution is
2|TB|(|TB|−1)+2c|TB| (1 + |TA|)+(A+ 1) |TB||TA| = 2|TB|
(
|TB| − 1 +
(
A+ 1
2
+ c
)
|TA|
)
.
As the number of links is |TB| (1 + |TA|) and the distance of type-B to type-A nodes is 1.
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The optimal social cost is then
2|TB|
(
|TB| − 1 +
(
A+ 1
2
+ c
)
|TA|
)
+ |TA| (|TA| − 1) (cA + A) .
Considering all quantities in the limit |TB|  |TA|  1 completes the proof.
Next, we evaluate the price of anarchy. In order to do that, we use the following two lemmas.
The first lemma evaluates a lower bound by considering the social cost in the stabilizable topology
presented in Fig 1(b), composed of a type-A clique and long lines of type-B players. Later on,
an upper bound is obtained by examining the social cost in any topology that satisfies Lemma
7.
For simplicity, in the following lemma we assume that |TB| = min
{⌊√
4cA
⌋
,
⌊√
4cB/5
⌋}
m
where m ∈ N and cB ≤ 20cA.
Lemma 13. Consider the network where the type B nodes are composed of m long lines of
length k = min
{⌊√
4cA
⌋
,
⌊√
4cB/5
⌋}
, and all the lines are connected at j ∈ TA. The total
cost in this stabilizable network is
S = |TA| (|TA| − 1) (cA/2 + A) + 2cB|TB|+ (A+ 1) |TB| (|TA| − 1) (k + 3) /2
+|TB| ((A+ 1) (k + 1) /2 + 2k − 4) + 2|TB|2(k + 2)2 − 2m
if |TB|  1, |TA|  1 then
S = (A+ 1) |TA| |TB| o(c)
+|TA|2 (c+ A) + |TB|2 o(c)
Proof: First, for the same reason as in Prop. 12, this network structure is immune to removal
of links. Consider j′ ∈ TA, j′ 6= j. Let us observe the chain (j, 1, 2, 3, ...k) where 1, 2, 3...k ∈ TB.
Clearly, the most beneficial link in j′ concern is (j′, k). By establishing it, its cost’s change is
∆C(j′, E + j′k) = cA − (k + 1) (k − 1) +mod(k + 1, 2)
4
> cA − k
2
4
> 0
by lemma 41 and noting the distance to player j is unaffected. Therefore there is no incentive
for player j′ to add the link (j′, k). The same calculation indicates that no additional link (i, i′)
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will be formed between two nodes on the same line.
Consider two lines of length k, (j, x1, x2, ...xk) and (j, y1, y2, ...yk). Consider the addition of
the link (xk, ybk+1/2c). That is, the addition of a link from an end of one line to the middle
player on another line. This link is optimal in x′ks concern, as it minimizes the sum of distances
from it to players on the other line. The change in cost is (see appendix)
∆C(xk, E + xkybk+1/2c) = cB − 5k2/4 > 0.
For any other player i = 1..k in the line (j, x1, x2, ...xk) we have
∆C(xk, E + xkybk+1/2c) ≤ ∆C(xk, E + xkyi)
since the player that gains the most from establishing a link to a node on the another line is
the player that is furthest the most from that line, i.e., the player at the end of the line. This
concludes the stability proof.
The total cost due to type-B nodes is
2cB|TB|+ (A+ 1) |TB| (|TA| − 1) (k + 3) /2
+ |TB| (A+ 1) (k + 1) /2 + 2m(k − 1)2 + 2(m− 1)mk2(k + 2)2.
The terms represent (from left to right) the links’ cost, the cost due to the type-B players’
distances to the type-A clique’s nodes (except j), the cost due to the type-B players’ distances
from node j, the cost due to intra-line distances and the cost due inter-lines distances. By using
the relation |TB| = km we have
= 2cB|TB|+ (A+ 1) |TB| (|TA| − 1) (k + 3) /2
+ |TB| (A+ 1) (k + 1) /2 + 2 (|TB| −m) (k − 1) + 2|TB|2(k + 2)2 − 2|TB|m(k + 2)
=2cB|TB|+ (A+ 1) |TB| (|TA| − 1) (k + 3) /2
+ |TB| ((A+ 1) (k + 1) /2 + 2k − 4) + 2|TB|2(k + 2)2 − 2m.
The total cost due to type-A is as before
|TA| (|TA| − 1) (cA + A) .
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Therefore,
∑
C(i) = |TA| (|TA| − 1) (cA/2 + A) + 2cB|TB|+ (A+ 1) |TB| (|TA| − 1) (k + 3) /2
+|TB| ((A+ 1) (k + 1) /2 + 2k − 4) + 2|TB|2(k + 2)2 − 2m
→ |TA|2 (cA + A) + (A+ 1) |TA| |TB| o(k) + |TB|2 o(k).
The most prevalent situation is when |TB|  |TA|  1. In this case we can bound the price
of anarchy to be at least o(k2) = o(cB).
The next lemma bounds the price of anarchy from above by bounding the maximal total cost
in the a link-stable equilibrium.
Lemma 14. The worst social utility in a link stable equilibrium is at most
|TA|2 (cA + A) + |TB|2 (cB + b2√cBc)
+ (A+ 1)
⌊
2
√
c
⌋ |TA||TB|
Proof: The total cost due to the inter-connectivity of the type-A clique is identical for
all link stable equilibria and is |TA| (|TA| − 1) (cA + A). The maximal distance between nodes
i, j according to Lemma 7 is
⌊
2
√
cB
⌋
and therefore the maximal cost due to the distances
between type-B nodes is
⌊
2
√
cB
⌋ |TB| (|TB| − 1). Likewise, the maximal cost due to the distance
between type-B nodes and the type-A clique is (A+ 1) b2√cc |TA||TB|. Finally, the maximal
number of links between type-B nodes is |TB| (|TB| − 1) /2 and the total cost due to this part
is |TB| (|TB| − 1) cB.
Adding all the terms we obtain the required result.
To summarize, we state the previous results in a proposition.
Proposition 15. If cB < A and |TB|  |TA|  1 the price of anarchy is Θ(cB).
D. Monetary transfers
Monetary transfers allow for a redistribution of costs. It is well known in the game theoretic
literature that, in general, this process increases the social welfare.Indeed, the next lemma, shows
that in this setting, the maximal distance between players is smaller, compared to Lemma 7.
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Lemma 16. Allowing monetary transfers, the longest distance between nodes i,j ∈ TB is
max{b2√cc , 1}. The longest distance between nodes i, j ∈ TA is bounded by
max
{⌊
2
(√
(A− 1)2 + c− (A− 1)
)⌋
, 1
}
The longest distance between node i ∈ TA and node j ∈ TB is bounded by
max
{⌊(√
(A− 1)2 + 4c− (A− 1)
)⌋
, 1
}
Proof: Assume d(i, j) = k ≥ b2√cc > 1 and j ∈ TB. Then there exist nodes (x0 =
i, x1,x2, ..xk = j) such that d(i, xα) = α. By adding a link (i, j) the change in cost of node i is,
according to lemma 7 is
∆C(i, E + ij)
=c− k (k − 2) +mod(k, 2)
4
<c− k (k − 2)
4
<0
Therefore, it is of the interest of player i to add the link.
Consider the case that j ∈ TA and
d(i, j) = k ≥
⌊
2
(√
(A− 1)2 + c− (A− 1)
)⌋
> 1
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The change in cost after the addition of the link (i, j) is
c−
k∑
α=1
d(i, xα)(1 + δxα,A(A− 1))
+
k∑
α=1
d′(i, xα)(1 + δxα,A(A− 1))
=c−
k∑
α=1
(d(i, xα)− d′(i, xα)) (1 + δxα,A(A− 1))
<c−
k∑
α=1
d(i, xα) +
k∑
α=1
d′(i, xα)
=c− (1 + k) k/2− kA+ 1 + (1 + k/2) k/2 + A− 1
=c− k2/4− k(A− 1)
If i, j ∈ TB then
∆C(i, E + ij) + ∆C(j, E + ij) < 2
(
c− k2/4) < 0
for k ≥ b2√cc and the link will be established.
Likewise, if i, j ∈ TA and
k ≥
⌊
2
(√
(A− 1)2 + c− (A− 1)
)⌋
the link (i, j) will be formed.
If i ∈ TA, j ∈ TB and
k ≥
⌊(√
(A− 1)2 + 4c− (A− 1)
)⌋
then
∆C(i, E + ij) + ∆C(j, E + ij) < 2c− k2/2− k(A− 1)
< 0
This concludes our proof.
Indeed, the next proposition indicates an improvement on Proposition 12. Specifically, it shows
that the optimal network is always stabilizable, even when A+1
2
> c. Without monetary transfers,
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Figure 5. The optimal state if A+1
2
> c . This network is stabilizable iff utility transfer is allowed, as discussed in Prop. 12
and Prop. 17.
the additional links in the optimal state (shown in [?]) (Fig. 4), connecting a major league player
with a minor league player, are unstable as the type-A players lack any incentive to form them.
By allowing monetary transfers, the minor players can compensate the major players for the
increase in their costs. It is worthwhile to do so only if the social optimum of the two-player
game implies it. The existence or removal of an additional link does not inflict on any other
player, as the distance between every two players is at most two.
Proposition 17. The price of stability is 1. If A+1
2
≤ c , then Proposition 12 holds. Furthermore,
if A+1
2
> c, then the optimal stable state is such that all the type B nodes are connected to
all nodes of the type-A clique. In the latter case, the social cost of this stabilizable network is
S = 2|TB|
(|TB|+ (A+12 + c) |TA|) + |TA|2 (c+ A) . Furthermore, if |TB|  1, |TA|  1 then,
omitting linear terms in |TB|, |TA|, S = 2|TB|(|TB|+ (A+ c) |TA|) + |TA|2 (c+ A) .
Proof: For the case A+1
2
≤ c , it was shown in Prop. 12 that the optimal network is a
network where all the type B nodes are connected to a specific node j ∈ TA of the type-A
clique (Fig. 4(a)) and that this network is stabilizable. Therefore, we only need to address its
stability under monetary transfers. We apply the criteria described in Corollary 6 and show that
for every two players i, j′ such that (i, j′) /∈ E we have
∆C(i, E + ij) + ∆C(j′, E + ij′) > 0.
If i ∈ TB then
∆C(i, E + ij′) = cB − 1 > 0.
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If i ∈ TA we have that
∆C(i, E + ij′) = cA − A > 0.
Then, for i ∈ TB and either j′ ∈ TA or j′ ∈ TB we have ∆C(i, E+ij)+∆C(j′, E+ij′) > 0 and
the link would not be established. For every edge (i, j) ∈ E we have that both ∆C(i, E+ij) < 0
and ∆C(j, E + ij) < 0 (Prop. 12) and therefore
∆C(i, E + ij) + ∆C(j, E + ij) < 0.
Assume A+1
2
> c. It was shown in Proposition 12 that the optimal network is a network where
every type B player is connected to all the members of the type-A clique (Fig. 4(b)). Under
monetary transfers, this network is stabilizable, since for for i ∈ TB , j ∈ TA
∆C(i, E + ij) + ∆C(j′, E + ij′)
= 2c− A− 1 < 0
and the link (i, j) will be formed. The previous discussion shows that it is not beneficial to
establish links between two type-B players. Therefore, this network is stabilizable.
In conclusion, in both cases, the price of stability is 1.
Next, we show that, under mild conditions on the number of type-A nodes, the price of anarchy
is 3/2, i.e., a fixed number that does not depend on any parameter value. As the number of major
players increases, the motivation to establish a direct connection to a clique member increases,
since such a link reduces the distance to all clique members. As the incentive increases, players
are willing to pay more for this link, thus increasing, in turn, the utility of the link in a major
player’s perspective. With enough major players, all the minor players will establish direct links.
Therefore, any stable equilibrium will result in a very compact network with a diameter of at
most three. This is the main idea behind the following lemma and theorem.
Proof: Assume d(i, j) = k > 2, where i ∈ TB and j ∈ TA but node j is not the nearest
type-A node to i. Therefore, there exists a series of nodes (x0 = i, x1, ..., xk−1, xk = j) such that
xk−1 is a member of the type-A clique.
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The change in player j’s cost by establishing (i, j) is
∆C(j, E + ij) = cA −
k∑
α=1
d(j, xα)(1 + δxα,A(A− 1))
+
k∑
α=1
d′(j, xα)(1 + δxα,A(A− 1))
< cA −
k∑
α=1
(d(j, xα)− d′(j, xα))
< cA − k2/4.
The corresponding change in player i’s cost is
∆C(i, E + ij) < cB − k2/4− (2k − 4)A− (k − 2)A · (|TA| − 2) .
The first term is the link cost, the second and third terms are due to change of distance from
players xk−1, xk and the last term express the change of distance form the rest of the type-A
clique. As
∆C(i, E + ij) < cB − k2/4− (k − 2)A · |TA|
the total change in cost is
∆C(j, E + ij) + ∆C(i, E + ij)
< 2c− k2/2− (k − 2)A · |TA|
< 0
for
k <
√
(A|TA|)2 + 4cA|TA| − A|TA|
Note that as the number of member in the type-A clique, |TA|, increases, the right expression
goes to 0, in contradiction to our initial assumption. Therefore, in the large network limit the
maximal distance of a type-B node from a node in the type-A clique is 2. In this case, the
maximal distance between two type-A nodes is 1 (as before), between type-A and type-B nodes
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is 2 and between two type-B nodes is 3. The maximal social cost in an equilibrium is
S < 3|TB| (|TB| − 1) + |TB|cB
+2|TB||TA| (A+ 1) + |TA| (|TA| − 1) (cA + A)
For |TB|  1, |TA|  1 we have
S = 3|TB|2 + 2|TB||TA| (A+ 1) + |TA|2 (cA + A) .
comparing this with the optimal cost in this limit
Sopt = 2|TB|2 + 2|TB||TA| (A+ 1) + |TA|2 (cA + A)
we obtain the required result.
This theorem shows that by allowing monetary transfers, the maximal distance of a type-B
player to the type-A clique depends inversely on the number of nodes in the clique and the
number of players in general. The number of ASs increases in time, and we may assume the
number of type-A players follows. Therefore, we expect a decrease of the mean “node-core
distance” in time. Our data analysis (Section V) indicates that this real-world distance indeed
decreases in time.
E. The effect of survivability
One may have guessed that reliability requirements, which generally induce the creation of
additional, backup edges, would ease the formation of the clique. The next proposition shows
that this naive assumption is wrong, and in fact, as the frequency of failure increases, it becomes
increasingly difficult to maintain the major player’s clique. Consider a dense set, in which every
player may access all the other players within two hops by a at least two disjoint paths. A direct
link between two players only reduces their mutual distance by one, and does not affect any
other distance. If this link fails often, it may be used only partially, and it may not be worthy
to pay its cost. Hence, in this setting, counter intuitively, frequent failures end up with a sparser
network.
Proposition 18. Assume the frequency of failures is high, namely δ = 1. Then, the type-A players
form a clique if and only if cA < A/2. Allowing monetary transfers does not change the result.
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Proof: We consider a major player’s clique and ask under which conditions the removal of
a link is a worthy move. Consider an edge (i, j) in this clique. Since only the shortest distance
between players i and j is affected, and is increased by one, the type-A players clique is stable
if and only if A/ (1 + δ) > cA.
The next proposition describes a scenario in which, surprisingly, the additional reliability
constraints reduce the social cost.
Proposition 19. Assume 1 < cA < A/2 and symmetric reliability requirements, namely τ =
1. Then, the optimal network is composed of a type-A clique, where all the type B nodes
are connected to all members of the type-A clique, as depicted in Fig. 4. This network is not
stabilizable, and PoS > 1. Nevertheless, for |TB|  |TA|  1, we have PoS → 1. In addition,
the Price of Reliability is smaller than one.
The main idea behind this result is that in the optimal, yet unstable solution, every minor
player established a link with all the major players (Fig. 4). This configuration is unstable as
it is over-saturated with links, and the optimal stable solution with survivability considerations
is obtained by diluting this network so that every minor player will connect to just two major
players. If the reliability requirements are further removed, then the additional dilution occurs,
increasing the social cost. In other words, the stable configuration is under-saturated with edges,
and the additional survivability requirements facilitate the formation of additional links.
Proof: ï¿œ ï¿œ We shall now prove the first part of this theorem, namely that the network
described in Fig. 4, is optimal in terms of social cost. In this network, every type-B player is
connected to every type-A player. We denote this network by G.
First, consider a network in which the type-A players are not in a clique. Similar to Proposition
18, there exists two players i, j ∈ TA such that d(i, j) ≥ 2. By establishing a link (i, j) the change
in social cost is
∆S ≤ −2
(
A
1 + δ
− cA
)
< 0.
Therefore a network which includes this link has a lower social cost. Hence, in the optimal
network, all the type-A players are in clique. A similar calculation for a missing link between
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player i ∈ TA and j ∈ TB shows that
∆S ≤ −
(
A+ 1
1 + δ
− cA − cB
)
< 0
and establishing this link reduces the social cost as well. In conclusion, in an optimal network
a type-A player is connected to all the other players.
Consider node i ∈ TB. Its distance from every other node j ∈ TB is d(i, j) = 2 and d′(i, j) = 2.
The minimal distances between two minor players i, j ∈ TB are d(i, j) = 1 and d′(i, j) = 2
whereas in G we have d(i, j) = d′(i, j) = 2. Assume that a network with a lower social cost
exists, and denote it by G′. In G′ there must exists a link between two type-B players, i, j ∈ TB.
However, removing this link reduces the social cost, as
S(E + ij)− S(E) = 2
(
A
1 + δ
− c
)
> 0
Therefore, G′ is not optimal, in contradiction to our assumption. This proves that G is optimal.
Next, we are going to show G is unstable. Consider i ∈ TB and x ∈ TA. By removing (i, x)
we cost change of player x is
∆C(x,E − ix) = −2
(
1
1 + δ
− c
)
> 0
And therefore it is beneficial for player x to remove this link. Hence, this network in not
stabilizable.
Finally, we are going to show that the PoR < 1. The outline is as follows. First, we are
going to show that the network depicted in Fig. 4 is stable. The optimal stable network (without
reliability requirements) in this parameter regime was explicitly derived Proposition 12. We are
going to show that the cost in the latter network is higher than the former, which bound the
PoR from above by a value smaller than one.
Consider a network in which all the minor players are connected to two major players, x, y ∈
TA. We are going to show that this network is stable. Clearly, as shown before, the type-A clique
is stable. In addition, for any player i ∈ TB neither x, y nor i has the incentive to remove either
(x, i) or (y, i) as it would violate the reliability requirement and would lead to unbounded cost.
Hence, this network is stable. Denote this network by G˜. In Proposition 12 it was shown that
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the optimal stable network (without reliability requirements) in this configuration is the network
in which all type-A players form a clique, and all the type-B players are connected to a single
type-A player. We denote the latter network by G′′.We have
S(G˜.)− S(G′′) = |TB|
(
A+ 1
1 + δ
− cA − cB
)
< 0.
But,
PoR =
S˜optimal
S˜
(bare)
optimal
≤ S(G˜.)S(G′′) = 1 +
S(G˜.)− S(G′′)
S(G′′) < 1.
This concludes the proof.
In conclusion, if the failure frequency is high, the survivability requirements will induce
dilution of the clique of major players. However, the opposite effect occurs along the graph
cut-set between the minor players set and the major players set, where the additional constraints
lead to an increased number of links connecting major and minor players.
So far we have assumed that the reliability requirements are symmetric. As explained in the
Introduction, in some cases it is reasonable to assume that players will require a backup route
only to the major players, i.e., non-symmetric reliability constraints. We shall now show that in
this case, the social cost may deteriorate considerably. Hence, from a system designer point of
view, it is much more important to incentivize a configuration where the reliability requirements
are symmetric, than to reduce failure frequency globally. This result stems from the following
lemma.
Lemma 20. If τ 6= 0 then for every two nodes i,j, d(i, j) ≤ d′(i, j) ≤ 2 + 2cB. If τ = 0 there
exists stable equiliberia such that there are no two disjoint paths between some nodes i, j.
Proof: First, we are going to show that d′(i, j) is finite (step 1). Then, in the second step,
we shall bound d′(i, j) from above.
Step 1: If i and j are disconnected, then it is worthy for both of them to establish the link
(i, j). Therefore, there exists a path from i to j and d(i, j) is finite. Assume d(i, j) 6= 1. If there
aren’t two disjoint paths between nodes i and j, it is worthy for both nodes to establish a direct
link. Hence if d(i, j) 6= 1 the distance d′(i, j) is finite. We now discuss the case d(i, j) = 1 and
show there must exists an additional disjoint path, so d′(i, j) is finite. We prove by negation.
Take node x 6= i, j. As before, both d(i, x) and d(x, j) are finite. Consider the following two
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cases:
A) d(i, x) = 1, d(x, j) = 1. Then, the trajectory (i, x, j) is disjoint from the path. Hence
d′(i, j) is finite.
B) d(i, x) = 1, d(x, j) 6= 1 or d(i, x) 6= 1, d(x, j) = 1. Without loss of generality, we assume
the first case. According to the previous discussion, there are at least two disjoint paths from
x to j. Since they are disjoint, only one of them may contain the edge (i, j). Therefore, there
exist a path (i, x, ...j) that is disjoint from the edge (i, j) and therefore d′(i, j) is finite.
C) d(i, x) 6= 1, d(x, j) 6= 1 . Applying the same reasoning as in B), there exists a path from i
to x that is disjoint from the edge (i, j). Likewise, there exists a path from j to x that is disjoint
from the edge (i, j). Therefore there exist a path from i to j that is disjoint from (i, j).
Step 2: Step 1 has shown that every two nodes are connected by a cycle. Let us assume the
longest shortest cycle connecting two nodes is of length l > 2 + 2cB > 3, namely there exists a
cycle (x0, x1, x2, ..., xbl/2c, ...xl, x0).
By establishing the link (x0, xbl/2c) the cost of player x0 due to distances from other players
is reduced by at least (l2 − 1 +mod(l + 1, 2)) /4, hence the link will be established as
∆C
(
x0, E + (x0, xbl/2c
) ≤ (l2 − 1 +mod(l + 1, 2))− cB ≤ 0
and similarly ∆C
(
x0, E + (x0, xbl/2c
) ≤ 0 . Since d(i.j) ≤ d′(i.j) ≤ l the proof is complete.
If there exist players with no two disjoint paths in an equilibrium, then the social cost becomes
unbounded. This immediately results in an unbounded Price of Anarchy, as indicated by the
following theorem.
Theorem 21. Consider a network such that TB  TA  1. The Price of Anarchy is as follows:
A) In a setting with asymmetric reliability requirements (τ = 0): unbounded.
B) In a setting with symmetric reliability requirements (τ 6= 0): bounded by o(c).
Proof: A) We shall prove this by showing that there exists a stable equilibrium with
unbounded social cost. Consider a network in which the major players (type-A players) form a
clique, while every minor player is connected only to a single type-A player j ∈ TA. We shall
show that this network is stabilizable. As discusses before, the type-A clique is stable. Consider
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i ∈ TB. By forming the link (i, x) the change of cost of player x ∈ TA, x 6= j is
∆C(x, ix) = cA − 1 > 0.
Hence, this link will be formed. No additional links between minor players will be established,
since such a link only reduces the distance between the participating parties by one, cB − 1 > 0
and does not provide an additional disjoint path to the type-A clique. Therefore, the social cost
is S = ω(Q)→∞.
B) The total cost due to the inter-connectivity of the type-A clique is identical for all link
stable equilibria and is |TA| (|TA| − 1) (c+ (1 + δ/2)A). This cost is composed of |TA−1| links
per node, and the distance cost to every other major nodes,
d(i, j) + d′(i, j) = 1 + δ/2.
Next, we evaluate the cost due to the type-B nodes inter-distances. According to Lemma 20,
both d(i, j) ≤ 4cB and d′(i, j) ≤ 4cB, so the cost due to the inter-distances between a type-B
player and every other player is bounded from above by 4cB (|TA|+ |TB|). When summed up
over all minor players, this contributes a term 4cB|TB| (|TA|+ |TB|) to the social cost. Likewise,
the cost of links that at least one of their ends is a type B player is at most cB|TB| (|TA|+ |TB|).
Therefore, the maximal cost in all link stable equilibria is bounded from above by
|TA| (|TA| − 1) (c+ (1 + δ/2)A) + 5cB|TB| (|TA|+ |TB|) .
The optimal network configuration is described in Proposition 19. It is straightforward to
evaluate the social cost in this configuration. The distance cost due to inter-distances of the
type-B players is
2|TB| (|TB − 1) ,
while the cost of all links which connect type-B players to type-A players is
|TB||TA| (cB + cA) .
Finally, the social cost due to the type-A clique remains the same, so finally we obtain that
the minimal social cost is
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Soptimal = |TA| (|TA| − 1) (c+ (1 + δ/2)A)
+2|TB| (|TB − 1) + 2|TB||TA| (cB + cA)
By taking the limits |TA| → ∞, |TB|/|TA| → ∞ we obtain that PoA ≤ 5cB/2.
A stable equilibrium with infinite social cost can be easily achieved by considering a network
where all minor players are connected to a single, designated, major player. There exists a
single path of at most two hops between every minor player to every major player. However,
as the stability requirements are asymmetric, the major players have no incentive to establish
additional routes to any minor player, and the reliability requirements of the minor players remain
unsatisfied.
If monetary transfers are feasible, players may compensate other players for the cost of
additional links such that all the additional constraints are satisfied. Therefore, in this setting, in
contrast to the previous setting, there always exists a fallback route between every two players,
regardless of the symmetric or asymmetric nature of the additional survivability constraints.
Hence, symmetry is less important than in the previous scenario. Furthermore, the following
result suggests that every player is connected to every other player by a cycle, and that the
maximal cycle length decays with the number of major players. As the number of ASs increases
in time, this predicts that the maximal cycle length should decrease in time. We shall verify this
prediction in Section V.
Proposition 22. Assume 1 < c < A/2 . Then, every two players are connected by a cycle, and
the maximal cycle length is bounded by
max
{
2
(⌊√
(A|TA|)2 + 5c− A|TA|
⌋
+ 1
)
, 4
}
.
Proof: Lemma 20 showed that the maximal distance between players is bounded. We are
going to tighten this result in the regime where monetary transfers are feasible. Denote the
maximal distance between a type-A player and a type B player by kA.
First, we are going to show that the maximal cycle length connecting a major player and a
minor player is 2kA + 1. This follows from a simple geometric argument. Consider two players,
i ∈ TA and j ∈ TB. Assume kA > 2. If the cycle length is 2kA + 2 or greater, there exists a
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type-B node that its distance kA+1, in contradiction to the assumption that the maximal distance
between a major player and and a minor player is kA. Denote the maximal distance between
two minor players by kB. A similar argument shows that maximal cycle length between two
minor players is 2kB + 1.
Next, are going to show that the maximal distance connecting a major player and a minor
player is kA ≤ l ≤ max
{
2
⌊√
(A|TA|)2 + 5c− A|TA|
⌋
, 2
}
. We prove by negation. Assume
that the distance between player j ∈ TA and i ∈ TB is l. Denote the nodes on the path as
(x0 = i, x1, x2...., xl = j). Then, by establishing a link between them, the distance between
j and {x0, x1....xbl/2c} (similarly, and distance between player i and players {xdl/2e...xl−1})
is reduced. In addition, player i reduces its distance to every node of the type-A clique by l.
Lemma 25 of [23] shows that the total reduction in distance is (l2 − 1 +mod(l + 1, 2)) /4. Then,
by establishing the link (i, j) we have
∆C(i, E + ij) + ∆C(j, E + ij) ≤ cA + cB − 2
(
l2 − 1)− lA|TA|
and as l ≥ 2
⌊√
(A|TA|)2 + 5c− A|TA|
⌋
this expression is negative. Therefore, the link will
be established, and the maximal shortest distance between a major player and a minor player is
smaller than l. This concludes the proof.
IV. DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
The Internet is a rapidly evolving network. In fact, it may very well be that it would never
reach an equilibrium as ASs emerge, merge, and draft new contracts among them. Therefore, a
dynamic analysis is a necessity. We first define the dynamic rules. Then, we analyze the basin
of attractions of different states, indicating which final configurations are possible and what
their likelihood is. We shall establish that reasonable dynamics converge to just a few equilibria.
Furthermore, we investigate the speed of convergence, and show that convergence time is linear
in the number of players. Lastly, we identify prevalent network motifs [30], i.e., small sub-graphs
that emerge during the natural evolution of the network, that arise due to survivability constraints.
In Section V we show that these motifs are indeed ubiquitous in the real AS topology, and that
the frequency of their occurrences is few folds more than expected in a random network.
35
A. Setup & Definitions
We split the game into turns, where at each turn only a single player is allowed to remove or
initiate the formation of links. At each point in time, or turn, the players that already joined the
game form a subset N ′ ⊂ TA∪TB. We shall implicitly assume that the cost function is calculated
with respect to the set N ′ of players that are already present in the network. Each turn is divided
into moves, at each of which a player either forms or removes a single link. A player’s turn is
over when it has no incentive to perform additional moves. Note that disconnections of several
links can be done unilaterally and hence iteratively.
During player’s i turn, all the other players will act in a greedy, rather than strategic, manner.
For example, although it may be that player j prefers that a link (i, j′) would be established
for some j′ 6= j, it will accept the establishment of the less favorable link (i, j), as long as its
formation is beneficial to it. In other words, the active player has the advantage of initiation
and the other players react to its offers. There are numerous scenarios in which players cannot
fully forecast other players’ moves and offers, e.g., when information is asymmetric or when
only partial information is available [27]. In these settings, it is likely that a greedy strategy will
become the modus operandi of many players. This is a prevalent strategy also when the system
evolves rapidly and it is difficult to assess the current network state and dynamics. Formally, we
express this dynamic rule as follows.
Definition 23. Dynamic Rule #1: Assume it is player i’s turn and let the set of links at its
mth move be denoted as Em. In player i’s mth move, it may remove a link (i, j) ∈ Em or, if
player j agrees, it may establish the link (i, j) /∈ Em. Player j would agree to establish (i, j) iff
C(j;Em + (i, j))− C(j;Em) < 0.
In a dynamic network formation game, a key question is: Can a player temporarily disconnects
itself from the graph, only to reconnect after getting to a better bargaining position? Or must
a player stay connected? If the timescale in which the costs are evaluated is comparable to
the timescale in which the dynamics occur, then, clearly, a player will not disconnect from
the network voluntarily. However, if the latter is much shorter, it may, for a very brief time,
disconnect itself from the graph in order to perform some strategic move. If player i cannot
temporarily increase its cost, then it will only act such that on each move (rather than on each
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turn) its cost will reduce. The following rules address the two alternative limits.
Definition 24. Dynamic Rule #2a: A link (i, j) will be added if i asks to form this link and
C(j;Em + ij) < C(j;Em). In addition, any link (i, j) can be removed in move m.
Dynamic Rule #2b: In addition to Dynamic Rule #2a, at the end of its move is cost is reduced.
Namely, player i may remove a link (i, j) only if C(i;Em − ij) < C(i;Em) and may establish
a link (i, j) if both C(j;Em + ij) < C(j;Em) and C(i;Em + ij) < C(i;Em)
If the game follows the stricter Dynamic Rule #2b, a player’s cost must be reduced at each
move, hence such multi-move plan is not possible.
Finally, the following lemma will be useful in the next section.
Lemma 25. Assume N players act consecutively in a (uniformly) random order at integer times,
which we’ll denote by t. the probability P (t) that a specific player did not act k∈ N times by
t N decays exponentially.
B. Basic Model - Results
After mapping the possible dynamics, we are at a position to consider the different equilibria’s
basins of attraction. Specifically, we shall establish that, in most settings of the basic model,
the system converges to the optimal network, and if not, then the network’s social cost is
asymptotically equal to the optimal social cost. The main reason behind this result is the
observation that a disconnected player has an immense bargaining power, and may force its
optimal choice. As the highest connected node is usually the optimal communication partner
for other nodes, new arrivals may force links between them and this node, forming a star-like
structure. There may be few star centers in the graphs, but as one emerges from the other, the
distance between them is small, yielding an optimal (or almost optimal) cost.
We outline the main ideas of the proof. The first few type-B players, in the absence of a
type-A player, will form a star. The star center can be considered as a new type of player, with
an intermediate importance, as presented in Fig. 6. We monitor the network state at any turn
and show that the minor players are organized in two stars, one centered about a minor player
and one centered about a major player (Fig. 6(a)). Some cross links may be present(Fig. 7). By
increasing its client base, the incentive of a major player to establish a direct link with the star
center is increased. This, in turn, increases the attractiveness of the star’s center in the eyes of
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minor players, creating a positive feedback loop. Additional links connecting it to all the major
league players will be established, ending up with the star’s center transformation into a member
of the type-A clique. On the other hand, if the star center is not attractive enough, then minor
players may disconnect from it and establish direct links with the type-A clique, thus reducing its
importance and establishing a negative feedback loop. The star will become empty, and the star’s
center x will be become a stub of a major player, like every other type-B player. The latter is the
optimal configuration, according to proposition 12. We analyze the optimal choice of the active
player, and establish that the optimal action of a minor player depends on the number of players
in each structure and on the number of links between the major players and the minor players’
star center x. The latter figure depends, in turn, on the number of players in the star. We map this
to a two dimensional dynamical system and inspect its stable points and basins of attraction of
the aforementioned configurations. This dynamic process shows how an effectively new major
player emerges out of former type-B members in a natural way. Interestingly, Theorem 26 also
shows that there exists a transient state with a better social cost than the final state. In fact, in
a certain scenario, the transient state is better than the optimal stable state.
Theorem 26. If the game obeys Dynamic Rules #1 and #2a, then, in any playing order:
a) The system converges to a solution in which the total cost is at most
S = |TA| (|TA| − 1) (c+ A) + 2cB|TB|+ (A+ 1) (3|TA||TB| − |TA|+ |TB|) + 2 (|TB| − 1)2 ;
furthermore, by taking the limit |TB|  |TA|  1, we have S/Soptimal → 1 .
b) Convergence to the optimal stable solution occurs if either:
1) A · kA > k + 1, where k ≥ 0 is the number of type-B nodes that first join the network,
followed later by kA consecutive type-A nodes (“initial condition”).
2) A · |TA| > |TB| (“final condition”).
c) In all of the above, if every player plays at least once in O(N) turns, convergence occurs
after O(N) steps. Otherwise, if players play in a uniformly random order, the probability the
system has not converged by turn t decays exponentially with t.
Proof: We first consider the case cA ≥ 2. Denote the first type-A player that establish a
link with a type-B player as k. First, we show that the network structure is composed of a
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Figure 6. a) The network structures described in Theorem 26. The type-A clique contains |TA| = 4 nodes (squares), and there
are |S| = 5 nodes in the star (red circles). There are |L| = 2 nodes that are connected directly to node k (yellow circles). The
number of type-A nodes that are connected to node 1, the star center, is |D| = 2 (green squares). b) The phase state of Theorem
26. The dotted green line is the |S| increase / decrease nullcline. The dotted (dashed) red line is the nullcline for the increase /
decrease in |D| when monetary transfers are forbidden (allowed). (Proposition 37).
type-A (possibly empty) clique, a set of type-B players S linked to player x ∈ TB, and an
additional (possibly empty) set of type-B players L connected to the type-A player k. See Fig.
6(a) for an illustration. In addition, there is a set D of type-A nodes that are connected to node
x, the star center. After we establish this, we show that the system can be mapped to a two
dimensional dynamical system. Then, we evaluate the social cost at each equilibria, and calculate
the convergence rate. We first assume (k, x) ∈ E and then discuss the case (k, x) /∈ E in. We
prove by induction. At turn t ≤ 2, this is certainly true. Denote the active player at time t as r.
If (k, x) ∈ E : Consider the following cases:
Case 1, r ∈ TA: Since 1 < cA < A, all links to the other type-A nodes will be established
(lemma 12) or maintained, if r is already connected to the network. Clearly, the optimal link
in r’s concern is the link with the star center x. If cB < A every minor player will accept a
link with a major player even if it reduces its distance only by one. Therefore, the link (r, x) is
formed if the change of cost of the major player r,
∆C(r, E + rx) = cA − |S| − 1 (2)
is negative. In this case, the number of type A players connected to the star’s center, |D|, will
increase by one. If this expression is positive and player r is connected to at least another major
player (as otherwise the graph is disconnected), the link will be dissolved and |D| will be reduced
by one. It is not beneficial for r to form an additional link to any type-B player, as they only
reduce the distance from a single node by one (see the discussion in lemma 12).
If cB ≥ A then the star center will not form a link to r, as such link reduce its distance to a
39
single major player by one. A link to any other minor player will not be beneficial to player r,
as it reduces its distance to a single minor player by at most two, and cA ≥ 2. The graph will
remain the same.
Case 2, r ∈ TB, r 6= x : First, assume that r is a newly arrived player, and hence it is
disconnected. Obviously, in its concern, a link to the star’s center, player x, is preferred over a
link to any other type-B player. Similarly, a link to a type-A player that is linked with the star’s
center is preferred over a link with a player that maintains no such link.
We claim that either (r, k) or (r, x) exists. Denote the number of type-A player at turn t as
mA. The link (r, x) is preferred in r’s concern if the expression
C(r, E + rk)− C(r, E + rx) = −A(1 +mA − |D|) + 1 + |S| − |L| (3)
is positive, and will be established as otherwise the network is disconnected. If the latter
expression is negative, (r, k) will be formed. The same reasoning as in case 1 shows that no
additional links to a type-B player will be formed. Otherwise, if r is already connected to the
graph, than according to Dynamic Rule #2a, r may disconnect itself, and apply its optimal policy,
increasing or decreasing |L| and |S|.
Case 3, r = x, the star’s center: r may not remove any edge connected to a type-B player and
render the graph disconnected. On the other hand, it has no interest in removing links to major
players. On the contrary, it will try to establish links with the major players, and these will be
formed if eq. 2 is negative. An additional link to a minor player connected to k will only reduce
the distance to it by one and since cB > 2 player x would not consider this move worthy.
The dynamical parameters that govern the system dynamics are the number of players in the
different sets, |S|, |L|, and |D|. Consider the state of the system after all the players have player
once. Using the relations |S|+ |L|+ 1 = |TB|, mA = |TA| we note the change in |S| depends on
|S| and |L| while the change in |D| depends only on |S|. We can map this to a 2D dynamical,
discrete system with the aforementioned mapping. In Fig. 6 the state is mapped to a point in
phase space (|S|, |L|). The possible states lie on a grid, and during the game the state move by
an single unit either along the x or y axis. There are only two stable points, corresponding to
|S| = 0, |D| = 1, which is the optimal solution (Fig. 4(a)), and the state |S| = |TB| − 1 and
|D| = |TA|.
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If at a certain time expression 2 is positive and expression 3 is negative (region 3 in Fig. 6(b)),
the type-B players will prefer to connect to player x. This, in turn, increases the utility a major
player gains by establishing a link with player x. The greater the set of type-A that have a direct
connection with x, having |D| members, the more utility a direct link with x carries to a minor
player. Hence, a positive feedback loop is established. The end result is that all the players will
form a link with x. In particular, the type-A clique is extended to include the type-B player
x. Likewise, if the reverse conditions appliy, a feedback loop will disconnect all links between
node x to the clique (except node k) and all type-B players will prefer to establish a direct link
with the clique. The end result in this case is the optimal stable state. The region that is relevant
to the latter domain is region 1.
However, there is an intermediate range of states, described by region 2 and region 4, in which
the player order may dictate to which one of the previous states the system will converge. For
example, starting from a point in region 4, if the type-A players move first, changing the |D|
value, than the dynamics will lead to region 1, which converge to the optimal solution. However,
if the type-B players move first, then the system will converge to the other equilibrium point.
If (k, x) /∈ E: We now discuss explicitly the case where, at some point, the link (k, x) is
removed and assume that cA > 2. In this case, the nullcline described by eq. 3 is replaced by
C(r, E + rk)− C(r, E + rx) = −A(1 +mA − |D|) + 2 (1 + |S| − |L|) . (4)
This changes the regions according to Fig. 8. Region 1, which is the basin of attraction for the
optimal configuration, increases its area, on the expense of region 4. The dynamical discussion
as described for the case (k, x) ∈ E is still applicable, and if the player play in a specific order,
than the state vector (|S|, |D|) will be in either region 1 or region 3 after Θ(1) turns. If the
players play in random order, then the system might not converge only if player k will play in
every Θ(1) turns. This probability decays exponentially, according to lemma 25.
We now extended our discussion to the case cA ≤ 2. Here, we claim that the structure s more
complex - there could be more than one major player with minor player clients, and some cross
links between different tiers may be present, as in Fig. 7. We denote the set of player k ∈ TA
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clients as Lk. We define player k∗ as a player such that
k∗ = arg max
k∈TA
|Lk|
namely, k∗ is a player with most direct clients.
Case 1: the active player is r ∈ TA −D. As before, the most beneficial link is a link to the
star’s center. As the l.h.s of Eq. 2 is negative, it will form a link with the star’s center if the
latter would agree. This will take place iff cB ≤ A. Otherwise, if
cB ≤ A (|TA| − |D| − 1) + 2 |Lk|
it may form a link with some j ∈ S, as in Fig. 7(c), as such link is beneficial for player j ∈ S
as well. No other links will be form, as they only reduce the distance to a singly type B player
by one, and if already r ∈ D and |S| 6= ∅ no other links will be removed (similar to the case
cA > 2).
Case 2: the active player is r ∈ TB, r 6= x. As in the case for cA > 2, after establishing its
preferred connection according to Eq. 3 (with L ← Lk∗) , the active player may establish its
preferred link - either as a client of the star center x, namely r ∈ S, or a client of k∗, r ∈ Lk∗.
Additionally, If r ∈ S, it may establish a link with k∗ if
cB ≤ A (|TA| − |D| − 1) + 2 |Lk∗|
as under this condition and cA < 2 such link is beneficial for both r and k∗. Note that such
link is preferred over any link to one of k’s clients. In this case, r is a member of both S
and Lk∗, and we address this by the transformation |S| ← |S|, |Lk∗| ← |Lk∗| + 1. Similarly, if
r ∈ L then it will establish links with the star center x if and only if cB ≤ 2. The analogous
transformation is |S| ← |S| + 1, |Lk∗| ← |Lk∗| . Additionally, consider a client i ∈ LK of a
major player k ∈ D clients. If cB ≤ 2, than a link between between i and star’s leaf, j ∈ S is
feasible and will be temporarily formed when i is the active player (see Fig. 7). This link will
be replaced by a link to player k during player j’s turn, according to the previous discussion.
Similarly, a link connecting client i ∈ LK of a major player k ∈ TA −D with the star center x
may be temporarily established, and will be replaced by the link (x, k) when x will play.
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Figure 7. Additional feasible cross-tiers links. The star players S are in red, the set L is in yellow. a) a link between the star
center and i ∈ L. b) a cross-tier link (i, j) where i ∈ S, j ∈ L. c) a minor player - major player link, (i, j) where i ∈ TA and
j ∈ S.
Figure 8. The dynamical regions with or without the link (k, x). The dashed green represents the new type-B player preference
nullcline when (k, x) ∈ E, according to eq. 3. According to eq. 4, the nullcline when (k, x) /∈ E is the solid green line.
Case 3: r = x, is the same as in the scenario where cA > 2.
We now turn to calculate the social cost at the different equilibria. If |D| = |TA| and |S| =
|T ′B| − 1, The network topology is composed of a |TA| members clique, all connected to the
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center x, that, in turn, has |TB| − 1 stubs. The total cost in this configuration is
S = |TA| (|TA| − 1) (cA + A) + 2cB|TB|+ (A+ 1) |TA|+ 2 (|TB| − 1)
+2 (|TB| − 1) (A+ 1) + 2 (|TB| − 2) (|TB| − 1) + (cB + cA) |TA|/2 (5)
where the costs are, from the left to right: the cost of the type-A clique, the cost of the type-B
star’s links, the distance cost (= 1) between the clique and node x, the distance (= 1) cost
between the star’s members and node x, the distance (= 2) cost between the clique and the
star’s member, the distance (= 2) cost between the star’s members, and the cost due to major
player link’s to the start center x. Adding all up, we have for the total cost
S ≤ |TA| (|TA| − 1) (c+ A) + 2cB|TB|+ (A+ 1) (3|TA||TB|+ |TB|) + 2 (|TB| − 1)2 . (6)
Convergence is fast, and as soon as all players have acted three times the system will reach
equilibrium. If every player plays at least once in o(N ) turns convergence occurs after o(N) turns,
otherwise the probability the system did not reach equilibrium by time t decays exponentially
with t according to lemma 25 ([29]).
Taking the limit TB →∞ and TB ∈ ω (TA) in eq. 6, we get S/Soptimal → 1. This concludes
the proof.
If the star’s center has a principal role in the network, then links connecting it to all the major
league players will be established, ending up with the star’s center transformation into a member
of the type-A clique. This dynamic process shows how an effectively new major player emerges
out of former type-B members in a natural way. Interestingly, Theorem 26 also shows that there
exists a transient state with a better social cost than the final state. In fact, in a certain scenario,
the transient state is better than the optimal stable state.
So far we have discussed the possibility that a player may perform a strategic plan, imple-
mented by Dynamic Rule #2a. However, if we follow Dynamic Rule #2b instead, then a player
may not disconnect itself from the graph. The previous results indicate that it is not worthy to
add additional links to the set of type-B nodes. Therefore, no links will be added except for the
initial ones, or, in other words, renegotiation will always fail. The dynamics will halt as soon
as each player has acted once. Formally:
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Proposition 27. If the game obeys Dynamic Rules #1 and #2b, then the system will converge to
a solution in which the total cost is at most
S = |TA| (|TA| − 1) (cA + A) + 3|TB|2 + 2cB|TB|+ 2|TA||TB| (A+ 1) .
Furthermore, for |TB|  |TA|  1, we have S/Soptimal ≤ 3/2. Moreover, if every player plays
at least once in O(N) turns, convergence occurs after O(N) steps. Otherwise, if players play
in a uniformly random order, the probability the system has not converged by turn t decays
exponentially with t.
Proof: We discuss the case cA ≥ 2. The proof follows along the same lines of the previous
theorem (Theorem 26). We claim that at any given turn, the network structure is composed of
the same structures as before (See Fig. 6(a)). We prove by induction. Clearly, at turn one the
induction assumption is true.
The dynamics of a is a newly arrived players are the same under Dynamic Rules #2a or #2b.
Therefore, if the active player is a newly arrived player, the analysis in Theorem 26 applies.
Hence, we only need to discuss the change in policies of existing players.
The only difference from the dynamics described in Theorem 26 is that the a type-B players
may not disconnect itself. Therefore, the only changes are in case 2 of Theorem 26, in which
the active player is r ∈ TB, r 6= x. Here, player r may not disconnect itself, and therefore, if it
already connected, it may not establish an additional link to star center (assuming r ∈ L) or to
any type-A player (if r ∈ S) as the utility to the other party is at most two, and cB ≥ cA ≥ 2. In
other words, depending on the sign of Eq. 3 at a type-B player arrival, it will become either a
leave of node k, namely, member of |L|, or members of the star |S|, and then becomes stagnant.
A similar analysis holds for the case (k, x) /∈ E, where the decision boundary is replaced Eq. 4
rather than Eq. 3.
We extended the discussion to a scenario where cA < 2. As before, we need to address only
case 2, in which the active player is r ∈ TB, r 6= x. If r ∈ S, as cA ≤ 2, player r may establish
links with a player j ∈ TB−D. This may allow it to disconnect from S. Therefore, player r ∈ S
may choose to be either a member of S or a member Lk∗, where now
k∗ = arg max
k∈TA−A
|Lk|
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according to the sign of Eq. 4. The rest of the analysis is the same as in Theorem 26
The maximal distance between a type-A player and a type B player is 2. The maximal value
of the type B - type B term is the social cost function is when |L| = |S| = |TB|/2. In this case,
this term contributes 3|TB|2 to the social cost. Therefore, the social cost is bounded by
S = |TA| (|TA| − 1) (cA + A) + 3|TB|2 + 2cB|TB|+ 2|TA||TB| (A+ 1) (7)
where we included the type-A clique’s contribution to the social cost and used cB ≥ cA.
Taking the limit N →∞ in eq. 7 and using TA ∈ ω(1), TB ∈ ω(TA), we obtain S/Soptimal ≤ 3/2.
Theorem 26 and Proposition 27 shows that the intermediate network structures of the type-B
players are not necessarily trees, and additional links among the tier two players may exist, as
found in reality. Furthermore, our model predicts that some cross-tier links, although less likely,
may be formed as well. If Dynamic Rule #2a is in effect, These structures are only transient,
otherwise they might remain permanent.
C. Monetary Transfers Dynamics
We now consider the dynamic process of network formation under the presence of monetary
transfers. For every node i there may be several nodes, indexed by j, such that ∆C(j, ij) +
∆C(i, ij) < 0, and player i needs to decide on the order of players with which it will ask to
form links. Each player’s decision is myopic, and is based solely on the current state of the
network. Hence, the order of establishing links is important, and may depends on the pricing
mechanism. There are several alternatives and, correspondingly, several possible ways to specify
player i’s preferences, each leading to a different dynamic rule.
Perhaps the most naive assumption is that if for player j, ∆C(j, ij) > 0, then the price it will
ask player i to pay is Pij = max{∆C(j, ij), 0}. In other words, if it is beneficial for player j
to establish a link, it will not ask for a payment in order to do so. Otherwise, it will demand
the minimal price that compensates for the increase in its costs. This dynamic rule represents
an efficient market. This suggests the following preference order rule.
Definition 28. Preference Order #1: Player i will establish a link with a player j such that
∆C(i, ij) + min{∆C(j, ij), 0}
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is minimal. The price player i will pay is
Pij = max{∆C(j, ij), 0}
As established by the next theorem, Preference Order #1 leads to the optimal equilibrium fast.
In essence, if the clique is large enough, then it is worthy for type-B players to establish a direct
link to the clique, compensating a type-A player, and follow this move by disconnecting from
the star. Therefore, monetary transfers increase the fluidity of the system, enabling players to
escape from an unfortunate position. Hence, we obtain an improved version of Theorem 26.
Theorem 29. Assume the players follow Preference Order #1 and Dynamic Rule #1, and either
Dynamic Rule #2a or #2b. If A+1
2
> c, then the system converges to the optimal solution. If
every player plays at least once in O(N) turns, convergence occurs after o(N) steps. Otherwise,
e.g., if players play in a random order, convergence occurs exponentially fast.
Proof: Assume it is player i’s turn. For every player j such that (i, j) /∈ E, we have that
d(i, j) ≥ 2. By establishing the link (i, j) the distance is reduced to one and
∆C(j, E + ij) + ∆C(i, E + ij)
≤ 2c+ (1− d(i, j)) (2 + δi,A(A− 1) + δj,A(A− 1)) .
This expression is negative if either i ∈ TA or j ∈ TA, as
2c− A− 1 < 0
Therefore, if player i ∈ TA it will form links all other players, whereas if i ∈ TB it will form
links with all the type-A players. Finally, after every player has played twice, every type-B player
has established links to all members of the type-B clique. Therefore, the distance between every
two type-B players is at most two. Consider two type-B players, i, j ∈ TB for which the link
(i, j) exists. If the link is removed, the distance will grow from one to two, per the previous
discussion. But,
47
∆C(j, E + ij) + ∆C(i, E + ij)
= 2c+ 2 (1− 2)
> 0
Hence, this link will be dissolved. This process will be completed as soon as every type-B player
has played at least three times. If every player plays at least once in o(N ) turns convergence
occurs after o(N) turns, otherwise the probability the system did not reach equilibrium by time
t decays exponentially with t according to lemma 25.
The resulting network structure is composed of a type-A clique, and every type-B player is
connected to all members of the type-A clique (Fig.4(b)). As discussed in Prop. 17, this structure
is optimal and stable.
Yet, the common wisdom that monetary transfers, or utility transfers in general, should increase
the social welfare, is contradicted in our setting by the following proposition. Specifically, there
are certain instances, where allowing monetary transfers yields a decrease in the social utility. In
other words, if monetary transfers are allowed, then the system may converge to a sub-optimal
state.
Proposition 30. Assume A+1
2
≤ c. Consider the case where monetary transfers are allowed and
the game obeys Dynamic Rules #1,#2a and Preference Order #1. Then:
a) The system will either converge to the optimal solution or to a solution in which the social
cost is
S = |TA| (|TA| − 1) (cA + A) + 2 (|TB| − 1)2 + (A+ 1) (3|TA||TB| − |TA|+ |TB|) + 2c|TB|.
For |TB| → ∞, |TB| ∈ ω (|TA|) we have S/Soptimal → 1 . In addition, if one of the first bc− 1c
nodes to attach to the network is of type-A then the system converges to the optimal solution.
b) For some parameters and playing orders, the system converges to the optimal state if
monetary transfers are forbidden, but when transfers are allowed it fails to do so. This is the
case, for example, when the first k players are of type-B, and 2c− A− 1 < k < c− 1.
Proof: a) We claim that, at any given turn t, the network is composed of the same structures
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as in Theorem 26. We use the notation described there. See Fig. 6 for an illustration. First, assume
that the link (k, x) exists.
We prove by induction. At turn t = 1 the induction hypothesis is true. We discuss the different
configurations at time t.
1. r ∈ TA: As in Theorem 26, all links to the other type-A nodes will be established or
maintained, if r is already connected to the network. The link (r, x) will be formed if the
change of cost of player r,
∆C(j, E + ij) + ∆C(i, E + ij) = 2c− A− |S| − 1 (8)
is negative. In this case |S| will increase by one. If this expression is positive and (r, x) ∈ E,
the link will be dissolved and |D| will be reduced. It is not beneficial for r to form an additional
link to any type-B player, as they only reduce the distance from a single node by 1 and A+1
2
≤ c.
2. r ∈ TB :The discussion in Theorem 26 shows that a newly arrived may choose to establish
its optimal link, which would be either (r, k) or (r, x) according to the sign of expression 3 in
Theorem 26. As otherwise the graph is disconnected, such link will cost nothing. Similarly, if
r is already connected, it may disconnect itself as an intermediate state and use its improved
bargaining point to impose its optimal choice. Hence, the formation of either (r, k) or (r, x)
is not affected by the inclusion of monetary transfers to the basic model. Assume the optimal
move for r is to be a member of the star, r ∈ S. If
∆C(k,E + kr) + ∆C(r, E + kr) = 2c− A|mA| − 1− |L| (9)
is negative, than this link will be formed. In this case, r is a member of both S and L, and we
address this by the transformation |S| ← |S|, |L| ← |L|+ 1 and |TB| ← |TB|+ 1. Similarly, if
r ∈ L than it will establish links with the star center x if and only if
2c < |S|+ 1. (10)
The analogous transformation is, |S| ← |S| + 1, |L| ← |L| and |TB| ← |TB| + 1. The is also
true if r = x and the latter condition is satisfied. We have shown in Theorem 26 that such links
only reduce the social cost, do not incite link removals, and do not effect the considerations of
new type-B player.
49
Consider the case that at some point the link (k, x) was removed. The new player preference
nullcline is described by eq. 4. Now, if r ∈ S, it has an increased incentive to establish a link
with k, as the nodes in L are farther away from it. In this case, the condition to establish the
link (k, r) is
∆C(k,E + kr) + ∆C(r, E + kr) = 2c− A|mA| − 1− 2|L| < 0
(compared to eq. 9) . Similarly, if r ∈ L the criteria for establishing the link (r, x) is 2c < 2|S|+1
(compared to eq. 10). The transformation described above should be applied in either case.
As before, as soon as all the players have played two time, the system will be in either region
1 or region 3, and from there convergence occurs after every player has played once more.
b) If dynamic rule #2a is in effect, the nullcline represented by eq. 8 is shifted to the left
compared to the nullcline of eq. 2, increasing region 3 and region 2 on the expanse of region 1
and region 4. Therefore, there are cases where the system would have converge to the optimal
state, but allowing monetary transfers it would converge to the other stable state. Intuitively, the
star center may pay type-A players to establish links with her, reducing the motivation for one
of her leafs to defect and in turn, increasing the incentive of the other players to directly connect
to it. Hence, monetary transfers reduce the threshold for the positive feedback loop discussing
in Theorem 26.
The latter proposition shows that the emergence of an effectively new major league player,
namely the star center, occurs more frequently with monetary transfers, although the social cost
is hindered.
A more elaborate choice of a price mechanism is that of “strategic” pricing. Specifically,
consider a player j∗ that knows that the link (i, j∗) carries the least utility for player i. It is
reasonable to assume that player j will ask the minimal price for it, as long as it is greater than
its implied costs. We will denote this price as Pij∗ . Every other player x will use this value and
demand an additional payment from player i, as the link (i, x) is more beneficial for player i.
Formally,
Definition 31. Pricing mechanism #1: Set j∗ as the node which maximize ∆C(i, E + ij∗). Set
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Pij∗ = max{−∆C(j∗, E, ij∗), 0}. Finally, set
αij = ∆C(i, E + ij)− (∆C(i, E + ij∗) + Pij∗)
The price that player j will require in order to establish (i, j) is
Pij = max{0, αij,−∆C(j, E + ij)}
As far as player i is concerned, all the links (i, j) such that Pij = αij carry the same utility,
and this utility is greater than the utility of links for which the former condition is invalidated.
Some of these links have a better connection value, but they come at a higher price. Since all
the links carry the same utility, we need to decide on some preference mechanism for player i.
The simplest one is the “cheap” choice, by which we mean that, if there are a few equivalent
links, then the player will choose the cheapest one. This can be reasoned by the assumption
that a new player cannot spend too much resources, and therefore it will choose the “cheapest”
option that belongs to the set of links with maximal utility.
Definition 32. Preference Order #2: Player i will establish links with player j if player j
minimizes
∆C˜(i, ij) = ∆C(i, ij) + Pij
and
∆C˜(i, ij) < 0
If there are several players that minimize ∆C˜(i, ij), then player i will establish a link with a
node (player) that minimizes Pij . If there are several nodes that satisfy the previous condition,
one will be chosen randomly.
Note that low-cost links have a poor “connection value” and therefore the previous statement
can also be formulated as a preference for links with low connection value.
Definition 33. Preference Order #1: Player i will establish a link with a player j such that
∆C(i, ij) + min{∆C(j, ij), 0}
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is minimal. The price player i will pay is
Pij = max{∆C(j, ij), 0}
Definition 34. “Strategic” Pricing mechanism: Set j∗ as the node that maximizes ∆C(i, E+ij∗).
Set P ∗ = max{−∆C(j∗, E + ij∗), 0}. Denote the excess utility of the link (i, j) as αij =
∆C(i, E + ij)− (∆C(i, E + ij∗) + P ∗) . The price player j requires in order to establish (i, j)
is Pij = max{0, αij,−∆C(j, E + ij)}.
We proceed to consider the dynamic aspects of the system under such conditions.
An immediate result of this definition is the following.
Lemma 35. If node j∗ satisfies
∆C(j∗, ij∗) < 0
then the link (i, j∗) will be formed. If there are few nodes that satisfy this criterion, a link
connecting i and one of this node will be picked at random.
Proof: As
Pij∗ = max{−∆C(j∗, E, ij∗), 0} = 0
∆C˜(i, ij) is maximal when ∆C(i, ij) is, which is for node j∗.
The resulting equilibria following this preference order are very diverse and depend heavily
on the order of acting players. The only general statement that can are of the form of Lemma
??. Before we elaborate, let us provide another useful lemma.
Lemma 36. Assume that according to the preference order player i will establish the link (i, j∗).
If there is a node x such that
∆C(i, (E + ij∗) + ix) < 0
∆C(x, (E + ij∗) + ix) < 0
∆C(i, (E + ix) + ij∗) + ∆C(j∗, (E + ix) + ij∗) > 0
Then effectively the link (i, x) will be formed instead of (i, j∗).
Proof: The first two inequalities state that after establishing the link (i, j∗) the link (i, x)
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will be formed as well. However, the last inequality indicates that after the former step, it is
worthy for player i to disconnect the link (i, j∗).
We proceed to consider the dynamic aspects of the system under such conditions.
Proposition 37. Assume that:
A) Players follow Preference Order #2 and Dynamic Rule #1, and either Dynamic Rule #2a
or #2b.
B) There are enough players such that 2c < TA · A+ T 2B/4.
C) At least one out of the first m players is of type-A, where m satisfies m ≥ √A2 + 4c− 1−A.
Then, if players play in a non-random order, the system converges to a state where all the
type-B nodes are connected directly to the type-A clique, except perhaps lines of nodes with
summed maximal length of m. In the large network limit, S/Soptimal < 3/2 + c .
D) If 2c > (A− 1) + |TB|/|TA| then the bound in (C) can be tightened to S/Soptimal < 3/2.
Proof: We prove by induction. Assume that the first type-B player is player kA and the first
type-A player is kB. We first prove that the structure up-to the first move of max{kA, kB} is a
type-A clique, and an additional line of maximal length |kB − kA| of type-B players connected
to a single type-A player.
If kA > kB = 1, there is a set of type-B players that play before the first type-A joins the
game, we claim they form a line. For the first player it is true. We denote the sequence of players
1...x and assume the assumption holds up to player x − 1 . Consider the newly arrived player
x. The least utility it may obtain is by establishing a link to a node at the end of the line, and
therefore it will connect first to one of the ends, as this would be the cheapest link. W.l.o.g,
assume that it connects to x − 1. The most beneficial additional link it may establish is (1, x)
but according to Corollary 41
∆C(x,E + 1x) + ∆C(1, E + 1x)
= 2∆C(1, E + 1x)
= 2c−−x (x− 2) +mod(x, 2)
2
> 2c− m (m− 2) + 1
2
> 0
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and therefore no additional link will be formed. Player kA will establish a link with a node
at one of the line’s ends, say to player kA − 1, and as
∆C(kA, E + 1kA) + ∆C(1, E + 1kA)
> 2c− m (m− 2) + 1
2
− (m− 2)(A− 1)
there would be no additional links between player kA and a member of the line.
If kA < kB = 1 then the first kB − 1 type-A player will form a clique (same reasoning as in
lemma 17), and player kB (of type-B) will form a link to one of the type-A players randomly.
This completes the induction proof.
For every new player, the link with the least utility is the link connecting the new arrival and
the end of the type-B strand. For a type-A player, using lemma 36, immediately after establishing
this link it will be dissolved and the new player will join the clique. Type B players will attach
to the end of the line and the line’s length will grow. Assume that when player x turn to play
there are mx type-A players in the clique. By establishing the link (i, x) we have (Fig. 9),
∆C(x,E + ix) < cB −mX · A
∆C(i, E + ix) = cA − (x+ 1) (x− 1) +mod(x+ 1, 2)
2
.
For x ≥ m ≥ √A2 + 4c− 1− A
∆C(x, ix) + ∆C(i, ix) < 2c−mX · A− x2/4 < 0
and therefore according to lemma 36 player x will connect directly to one of the nodes in
the clique instead of line’s end. After all the players have played once, the structure formed is a
type-A clique, a line of maximum length m, and type-B nodes that are connected directly to at
least one of the members of the clique. In a large network, the line’s maximal length is o(
√
TB)
and is negligible in comparison to terms that are o(TB).
The only possible deviation in this sub-graph is establishing additional links between a type-B
player and clique members (other than the one it is currently linked to). This will only reduce
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Figure 9. The suggested dynamics in Prop. 37. Here, x = 4 and mX = 4. The link to the clique is dashed in orange, the
canceled link is in dotted green.
the overall distance. Hence we can asymptotically bound the social cost by
S < 3|TB|2 + 2|TB||TA| (A+ 1)
+2|TB||TA|c+ |TA|2 (cA + A)
where the first term expresses the (maximal) distance between type-B nodes, the second
the distance cost between the type-A clique and the type-B nodes, the third is the cost of
links between type-A players and type-B players and the third is the cost of the type-A clique.
Comparing this to the optimal solution (Proposition ??) under the assumption that TB > TA, we
have
S/Soptimal < 3
2
+ c.
This concludes the proof.
D) We can improve on the former bound by noting that according to Preference Order #2,
when disconnecting from the long line a player will reconnect to the type-A player that has the
least utility in his concern (and hence requires the lowest price). In other words, it will connect
to one of the nodes that carry the least amount of type-B nodes at that moment. Therefore, to
each type-A node roughly |TB|/|TA| type-B nodes will be connected. This allows us to provide
the following corollary.
According to the aforementioned discussion by establishing a link between node j ∈ TB and
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Figure 10. The network structure described in Prop. 37. The type-B players connect almost uniformly to the different members
of the type-A clique. In addition, there is one line of type-B players.
i ∈ TA (where j in not connected directly to i) the change of cost is
∆C(i, ij) = cA − A− |TB||TA|
∆C(j, ij) = cB − 1
but
∆C(i, ij) + ∆C(j, ij) = 2c− (A− 1)− |TB||TA| > 0
and the link would not be establish. Hence, we can neglect the term 2|TB||TA|c and
∑
C(i) < 3|TB|2 + 2|TB||TA| (A+ 1) + |TA|2 (cA + A)
By comparing with the optimal solution we obtained the required result.
In order to obtain the result in Proposition ??, we had to assume a large limit for the number
of type-A players. Here, on the other hand, we were able to obtain a similar result yet without
that assumption, i.e., solely by dynamic considerations.
It is important to note that, although our model allows for monetary transfers, in every resulting
agreement between major players no monetary transaction is performed. In other words, our
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model predicts that the major players clique will form a settlement-free interconnection subgraph,
while in major player - minor player contracts transactions will occur, and they will be of a
transit contract type. Indeed, this observation is well founded in reality.
D. Network Motifs
We now show that, under survivability constraints, during the natural evolution of the network a
“double star” sub-graph, or network motif, often emerges. In the “double star” motif, as depicted
in Fig. 11, there exists a primary and a secondary star. All the minor players are connected to the
primary star’s center. Part of the players are also connected to the other star’s center, forming the
secondary star. Consider a region where it is immensely difficult to establish a link to a major
player, either due to geographical distance, link prices or perhaps additional physical links are
simply not accessible. Nevertheless, in order to maintain a reliable connection, there must be
at least two links that connect this region to the Internet backbone via some major players. In
order to provide a stable, fault tolerant service, every player in this region will form links with
the players hosting the endpoints of these links, forming the double star sub-graph. Assume now
that link prices reduce over time, or that the importance of a fast connection to the Internet
core increases in time. In this case, players may decide to establish direct links with the major
players, and remove either one of both links connecting them to the star centers. Note though,
that players will be reluctant to disconnect from the star center if the number of nodes in the
star is large.
Moreover, the next theorem also shows that, eventually, and fairly quickly, the system will
converge to either the optimal stable state, or to a state in which the social cost is a low multiple
of the optimal social cost.
Theorem 38. Assume symmetric reliability requirements, i.e., τ = 1. If the players follow
Dynamic Rules #1 and #2a, then, in any playing order:
A) The system converges to either the optimal stable state, depicted in Fig. 4, or to the network
depicted in Fig. 11.
B) In the large network limit, namely, when |TB|  |TA|  1, the social costs ratio satisfy
S/Soptimal < 3/2 + , with → 0.
C) if players play in a uniformly random order, the probability that the system has not
57
Figure 11. Network Motifs. a) A network configuration which includes a “double-star” structure of minor players. Every node
in the primary star (encircled in yellow) is linked to a major player, node k (in green). A direct link connects the two star
centers, denoted by 1 and 2 (in pink). The members in the secondary star (in purple) are connected to both star centers. In
addition, there secondary star center is also connected to the major player k. There might be additional minor players outside
the stars (in red). b) The “entangled cycles” motif. Six minor player are connected in an “entangled cycles” subgraph. The first
two nodes have direct connection to some major player, and access the rest of the network by the major player’s additional
links, represented by the dotted line. c) If at some point, a link between a player in this subgraph and some external player is
formed (in this example, a major player), some links may be removed without violating the reliability requirement and without
increasing the distance cost appreciably. The removed links marked by a red X. and a generalized star about node k, k′ of (the
red type-B nodes). In this example, mA = 4, mSA = 2,mS′A = 1,mB = 2,mS = 3,mS′ = 4 .
converged by turn t decays exponentially with t. Otherwise, if every player plays at least once
in O(N) turns, convergence occurs after O(N) steps.
Proof: We claim that the network, at any time, has the following structure (Fig. 11): A
type-A players’ clique, and at most two type-B star centers 1, 2 ∈ TB. The larger ball’s center
is labelled as 1, and the smaller is 2. We denote the set of type-B players which are members
of the star centered about node 1 (2) as S1 and (correspondingly, S2). We have |S1| ≥ |S2| . In
addition, some type-B players might be linked to two nodes k, k′ ∈ TA, the set of these type-B
players is denoted by L. The set of type-A players that have a direct link with the star center 1
(star center 2) is denoted by D1 (correspondingly D2). Players {1, 2, k} form a clique. Assuming
the second star exists, it is connected to either players 1 or k′ (or both). Finally, there may be
additional links between players is L and D2. An example of this network structure is presented
in Fig. 11.
We prove by induction. After the first three players played the induction base case is true. We
first assume that the link (1, 2) and consider the case (1, 2) /∈ E later. Denote the active player
by r. Consider the following cases:
1. r ∈ TA: As c < A/2, r will form (or maintain) links with every type-A player. If additional
links to minor players are to be formed, it is clearly better for player r to establish links first
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d(i, j) i ∈ n1 i ∈ n2 i ∈ n3
j = 1 1 1 2
j ∈ S1 2 2 2
j = 2 2 1 2
j ∈ S2 2 2 3
j ∈ L 2 2 2
j = k 1 2 1
j = k’ 2 2 1
j ∈ D2, j 6= k, k′ 2 2 2
j ∈ TA, j /∈ D2 2 3 2
Table I
THE SHORTEST DISTANCE d(i, j) BETWEEN TWO NODES, AS DISCUSSED IN PROP. 38. NOTE THAT IF k′ ∈ D2 , THAN
COLUMN 9 APPLIES INSTEAD OF COLUMN 8 FOR i ∈ S2 .
d′(i, j) i ∈ n1 i ∈ n2 i ∈ n3
j = 1 2 2 2
j ∈ S1 2 3 2
j = 2 2 2 3
j ∈ S2 3 2 3
j ∈ L 3 3 2
j = k 2 2 2
j = k’ 2 3 2
j ∈ D2, j 6= k, k′ 2 2 2
j ∈ D1, j /∈ D2 2 3 2
j /∈ D1,j ∈ TA 3 3 2
Table II
THE SECOND SHORTEST DISTANCE d′(i, j) BETWEEN TWO NODES, AS DISCUSSED IN PROP. 38. NOTE THAT IF k′ ∈ D2 ,
THAN COLUMN 9 APPLIES INSTEAD OF COLUMN 8 FOR i ∈ S2 .
with either player 1 or player 2 than to any player in i ∈ S1 or i ∈ S2. We first consider the
case where r /∈ D1 ∪D2 and split into two cases:
1A) If no two disjoint paths exists between player r to players 1 or 2, namely, if |TA| ≥ 2
and either |D1| < min{|TA|, 2} or |D2| ≤ min {|TA|, 2}, then it is beneficial for both r and the
star centers to link such that reliability requirements will be satisfied.
1B) If D2 6= ∅ then by establishing the edge (r, 1) we have
∆C(r, E + 1r) = c− 1 + |S1|
1 + δ
while by establishing (r, 2) the change of cost is:
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∆C(r, E + 2r) = c− 1 + |S2|
1 + δ
. (11)
As |S2| ≤ |S1|, player r will prefer to establish first a link with player 1 rather than with
player 2. The link will be formed if ∆C(1, E + 1r) ≤ 0, which is true if
|D1| ≤ 1
or (12)
cB < A/ (1 + δ) .
If condition 11 holds, then player r will attempt to form a link with the star center 2, and succeed
if condition 12 holds as well. Establishing a link to any other type-B node is clearly an inferior
option, as if a player had decided to establish links with either node 1 or node 2, an additional
link to one of their leafs will only reduce the distance to it by 1 and hence is not a worthy
course of action. Therefore, D2 ⊆ D1.
2. r ∈ TB and r 6= 1, 2. A player may disconnect itself and then choose its two optimal links.
Clearly, among the type-A clique, player r′s best candidates are players k, k′, while among the
type-B players, the cost reduction is maximal by linking to nodes 1, 2. In addition, a link to
node k is at least as preferred a link to k′, while a link to node 1 is always preferred over a
link to node 2 as long as n1 ≥ n2. Therefore, we only need to consider three possible moves
by player r - linking to k, k′ (the red players in Fig. 11), linking to k, 1 or linking to 1, 2.
Using tables I and II we can compare the cost of connecting to nodes 1, 2 versus the costs of
connecting to nodes 1 and k. A simple calculation shows that if the expression
A− 1 + (|D1| − |D2|)A+ δ |S1| − |S2|+ A+ A(|TA| − |D2|)
1 + δ
is positive, than linking to players 1 and k is preferred over linking to player 1 and 2. This
expression is positive, as |D1| ≥ |D2 and |S2| ≤ |S1|.
In a similar fashion, we can compare between the choices of linking to nodes 1 and k or
forming links with nodes k and k′. If the expression
1 + |S2| − A+ δ1− |L| − A(|TA| − |D1|)
1 + δ
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is positive, then establishing links to 1 and k is preferred, otherwise the alternative will be
chosen. Two special cases are of interest: If |S2| < A − 1 and δ = 0, then every player will
prefer to link to k and k′. That is, we’ll get the optimal configuration. If δ = 1, TA = D1, i.e,
node 1 is a member of the clique, |L| = 0 and |S2|  1, then a minor player will connect to
players 1 and k. Note that if there are no type-A players present when r plays, then it must
connect to the star centers 1 and 2.
In addition, after r formed two links, no player x ∈ TA ∪ {1, 2} ∪D1 ∪ L will agree to form
the link (x, r), as the induced change of cost is
∆C(x,E + xr) ≥ cA − 1 > 0.
If cB ≤ 2 and δ → 0 then player r ∈ L and player x ∈ D2 will establish the link (x, r). By
symmetry, this also happens when r ∈ D2 and x ∈ L.
3. If r = 1, then it must maintain links to all nodes in S2∪S1∪{2} (if there are any) in order
to satisfy the reliability criteria. Additional links to type-A players will be formed according to
the discussion in case 1, while no other links to type-B player will be formed according to the
discussion in case 2.
4. If r = 2, then it must maintain links to all nodes in S2 (if there are any) in order to satisfy
the reliability criteria. A similar calculation to the one in case 2 shows that player 2’s best course
of action is to remain connected to player
In order to complete the induction proof all that is left is to address the case (1, 2) /∈ E. In
this case, player 2 must be connected to at least one additional player i /∈ S2 in order to have
two disjoint path to every player in the network. Clearly, its optimal choice is player k′. In order
to maintain reliable path to every i ∈ S2 ∪ {2} player k′ must agree to form this link. Player 2
will disconnect (1, 2) if either ∆C(2, E − 12) ≤ 0 or ∆C(2, E − 12 + 2k′) ≤ 0 . However, if
either of this conditions hold, Tables I and II show that every i ∈ TB/{2} would prefer to link
to player k′ rather than player 2. In particular, this is also true for every node i ∈ S2. Therefore,
as soon as every member in S2 played once, the star will be empty and no additional star will
raise again. Therefore, there will be at most one star left in the network.
This completes the proof on the momentarily structure of the network. Note that if |S1| =
|S2| = ∅ we obtain the optimal stable solution.
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B) Since every minor player has either two or three links, the contribution to the social cost
due to minor players’ links is o(|TB|), while the contribution to the social costs due to the
inter-distances between minor players is o (T 2B). In the limit |TA| → ∞, |TB|/|TA| → ∞, the
dominant term in the cost function is the term proportional to |TB|2. Both d(i, j) and d′(i, j) for
i, j ∈ TB are bounded by 3, and comparing this results with the optimal social cost (Proposition
19) we have
S
Soptimal =
3T 2B + o(T
2
B)
2T 2B + o(T
2
B)
≤ 3
2
+ 
with → 0 in the limit |TA| → ∞, |TB|/|TA| → ∞.
C) The discussion of case 2 shows that in a large network, it is suboptimal for a minor player
to be a member of S2. Given the the opportunity, it will prefer to become a member in either
S1 or L. Therefore, after every player has played at least twice, S2 = ∅, and after every player
has played four times the system will reach equilibrium. Lemma 13 in [23] then shows that the
probability that the system has not converged by turn t decays exponentially with t.
In section III we emphasized the importance of symmetry in the reliability requirements for
reducing the Price of Anarchy. The next theorem affirms this assertion, and shows that if the
constraints are asymmetric, the system converges to a state with an unbounded social cost on a
large set of possible dynamics and initial conditions.
Theorem 39. Assume asymmetric reliability requirements, namely τ = 0. If the players follow
Dynamic Rules #1 and either Dynamic Rule #2a or #2b, then the system converges to a state
with an unbounded social cost.
For technical reason, we define the cost of a node with violated survivability constrains as Q,
and take Q→∞, such that Q is greater than any property, namely
Q ∈ ω (exp (TA + TB + A+ cA + cB)) .
Proof: The idea behind the proof is to show that the reliability requirements of at least one
minor player remain unsatisfied, the therefore the social costs, as a sum over individual costs,
is unbounded.
First assume that cA > 2. We shall now show that at any given turn, the network is composed
of a type-A (possibly empty) clique, a set of type-B players S linked to player x, acting as a
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star center, and an additional (possibly empty) set of type-B players L connected to the type-A
player k. Player x is also connected to player k. Some major player may establish links with
the star center x. The set of these major players is denoted by D. Note that the cost of every
player in either S or L is Q → ∞, since every path from each of these players to the type-A
clique crosses player k.
We prove by induction. At turn t ≤ 2, this is certainly true. Denote the active player at time
t as r. Consider the following cases:
1. r ∈ TA: Since 1 < cA < A, all links to the other type-A nodes will be established or
maintained, if r is already connected to the network. Clearly, the optimal link in r’s concern is
the link with the star center x. Therefore, player r will attempt to establish the link (r, x) if
∆C(r, E + rx) = cA − |S| − 1 (13)
is negative. If cB < A/ (1 + δ) or that |D| ≤ 1 then x will accept this link. Regardless, if player
r has formed the link it will not establish a link with i ∈ S, as it only reduces its distance to
player i by a single hop, and
∆C(r, E + ir) = cA − 1 ≤ 0. (14)
If Eq. 13 is positive, then, player r has no incentive to establish a link with any i ∈ S, as
|S| ≥ 1 and the by establishing (i, r) the sole change is the reduction of d(i, r) from 3 to 1,
∆C(r, E + ir) = cA − 2 ≥ cA − |S| − 1 = ∆C(r, E + rx) ≥ 0.
Eq. 14 also shows that if r 6= k, it will not form a link with i ∈ L, while if r = k it may not
remove the link (k, i) as otherwise i is disconnected.
2. r ∈ TB, r 6= x : First, assume that r is a newly arrived player, hence it is disconnected.
Obviously, in its concern, a link to the star’s center, player x, is preferred over a link to any
other type-B player. Similarly, a link to a player k is preferred over a link to any other type-A
player (or if L = ∅ and D = TA, equivalent to a link to any other type-A player). Therefore, r
first link choice would be either (r, k) or (r, x). In other words, r ∈ L or r ∈ S. If r ∈ L, than
no i ∈ TA will agree to establish a link with r, as it only reduces its distance from r by one
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hop, and doesn’t alter d(i, x) for any other x. Similarly, if r ∈ S than
∆C(i, E + ri) = cA − 2 > 0
and the link would not be formed. Likewise, no link between i ∈ L and j ∈ S may be formed,
as
∆C(i, E + ij) = cB − 2 > cA − 2 > 0
3. r = x, the star’s center: r may not remove any edge connected to a type-B player and
render the graph disconnected. On the other hand, the previous discussion shows it will not
establish additional links to nodes in L.
Note that the reliability requirements of players in L ∪ S are invalidated. Therefore, the cost
of every player j ∈ L ∪ S is Q, and we have Q → ∞. Hence, at any given turn, as soon as
either |L| > 1 and |S| ≥ 1, the social cost is unbounded.
If cA < 2 a link between player i ∈ TA and player r ∈ TB will be formed. However, as soon
as player i becomes the active player, it is beneficial for it to remove the link (i, r) and establish
a link to the star center (i, x) instead. Therefore, after player i’s turn, the cost of player r is
again Q. In a similar fashion, if cB < 2 than player i ∈ S and player j ∈ L may establish the
link (i, j). This does not affect any other player and while it may reduce their costs, it does not
provide them with two disjoint paths to the type-A clique, as they both must traverse player k
in order to access it. Therefore, their costs is still Q.
An additional network motif, the “entangled cycles” motif, arises when monetary transfers
are taken into account. This network motif is composed of a line (i.e., interconnected sequence)
of minor players’ nodes, with some cross-links between the nodes along this line, breaking the
hierarchy (Fig. 11). The “entangled cycle” of length three is the “feedback loop” motif, which
was previously found to exist in a higher frequency than expected in the Internet graph [30].
When a new minor player arrives, it will choose the two cheapest links and will connect to
the corresponding players. Clearly, its costs due to the distance from the rest of the network will
be the highest. As such, when the next player arrives, it will offer the lowest link price. The new
arrival will link to it and to one of its providers. The process will repeat, until, at some point, an
existing player will decide that this growing branch is too far from it, and will connect to one
of the nodes along this “entangled cycles”. At this point, this subgraph will be over-saturated
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with links as players may utilize this link to access the Internet core. Hence, some links will be
removed (see, for example Fig. 11(b)). The set of the links that will be removed depends heavily
on the playing order and the temporary network structure. Nevertheless, some cross-links may
remain in order to satisfy reliability constrains. This explains the following result.
Theorem 40. Assume the number of major players is at least |TA| ≥
√
4c. Denote the distance
cost of player i ∈ Tβ, β ∈ {A,B}, as D(i), namely
D(i) = Cβ(i)− cβdeg(i) · xi
Assume that a subset W of minor player first join the game and play consecutively and that the
two players with the maximal distance cost are adjacent. Then:
A) These players will form an “entangled cycles” structure of length l, as depicted in Fig.
11, and
l ≤ 2
√
(A|TA|)2 + 5A− 2A|TA|.
B) The “entangled cycles” structure is semi-stable, in the following sense: If, at some later
turn, there exist players j /∈ W , i ∈ W such that the link (i, j) is formed (Fig. 11(b)), then some
links in the “entangled cycles” structure may be removed in subsequent turns.
Proof: Assume that at time t a subset of W = {x1, x2...xm} players first join the game.
Denote the set of players that are connected to the network at time t as N ′. We denote by nA
(nB) the number of type A players (correspondingly, type-B player) at that moment. Let us
denote the players with the highest distance cost term as x0 and x−1, namely,
x0 = arg max
i∈N ′
C(i)− cBdeg(i) · xi
x−1 = arg max
i∈N ′\{x0}
C(i)− cBdeg(i) · xi
where for simplicity we assumed that x0, x−1 are minor player (type-B players). According to
the “strategic” pricing mechanism a new player will establish links with these players, as they will
offer the cheapest links. Note that by connecting to these players, its survivability requirement
are satisfied, as each of these players maintain two disjoint path to every major player (if the
reliability requirements are asymmetric) or to all other players (in case of symmetric reliability
requirements).
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We are now going to prove by induction that at step j, player xj will connect to players xj−1
and xj−2. We shall prove by this by showing that the distance cost of xj−1 and xj−2 is maximal.
Assume the induction holds, and every player {x1, x2...xj−1} is connected only to its two
predecessors, which, at the time it played, had the maximal distance cost. First, note that for
every player xj′ = 1...j− 1, we have D(xj′) ≥ D(xj′−1) and D(xj′) > D(xj′−2), since the path
from j’ to every player in N ′ pass through xj′−1 or xj′−2, and N ′  l > |W |. Therefore, in
order to show that players xj−1 and xj−2 have the highest distance cost, it is sufficient to show
that D(xj−1) > D(y) for every y ∈ N ′. For every player i ∈ N ’ we have
d(xj−1, i) ≥ d(x0, i) + bj/2c
d′(xj−1, i) ≥ d′(x0, i) + bj/2c
since the path that connects player xj−1 to the any player i ∈ N ′ crosses either player x0 or
x−1, which are adjacent. Therefore, the distance cost of player xj−1 due to its distance from
every player i ∈ N ′, denoted by D˜(xj−1) is at least grater than the corresponding distance cost
of player x0, D˜(x0) by at least (AnA + nB) bj/2c. Note that D˜(x0) ≥ D˜(y) for every y ∈ N ′
according to the definition of x0. However, player xj′−1 may be closer to players {x1, x2...xj−2}
than player y. Denote the maximal distance between any two players by r. We have,
D(xj−1)−D(y) ≥ (AnA + nB) bj/2c − r · j
where r is the maximal distance between two players. In proposition 22 it was shown that
r ≤ 2
⌊√
(AnA)
2 + 5c− AnA
⌋
|
Plugging in the relation |TA| ≥
√
4c we obtain
r ≤
⌊
AnA
2
⌋
And therefore D(xj−1) − D(y) ≥ 0. Therefore, links will be established as stated. This
shows that at the time player xj joins the game, the distance cost of player xj−1 is maximal.
A similar calculation shows that at this turn, the distance cost D(xj−2) is maximal in the set
{D(i)|i ∈ N ′ ∪ {x1, ..xj−2}}.
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Figure 12. Structure of the AS topology. a) The sub-graph of the top 40 ASs, according to CAIDA ranking, in January,
2006. b) The minor nodes sub-graph was created by omitting nodes in higher k-core (k ≥ 3) and removing any links from the
shell to the core. The subgraph contains 16,442 nodes, which are ∼ 75% of the ASs in the networks. Left: The full network
map. Singleton are displayed in the exterior and complex objects in the center. Right: A zoom-in on a sample (red box) of the
subgraph. The complex structure are mainly short lines and stars (or star-like objects).
We have thus far shown that the first two links of a new player xj are to players xj−1 and xj−2.
Nevertheless, as the “entangled cycles” motif grows, the incentive of other players to connect
to players in it increases. At some point, player j may be able to form links with players not in
W , or an active player r /∈ W may decide to connect to some player in W (or vice versa for
r ∈ W ). In either of these cases, players in the “entangled cycles” motif may have three disjoint
paths to other players, and may therefore remove a link, should they deemed to do so. In this
case, the “entangled cycles” motif will be diluted.
This theorem shows that reliability is a major factor in breaking up tree hierarchy in the
Internet. In addition, it also hints that the hierarchical structure does not break frequently in
the top levels of the Internet, but rather mostly in the intermediate and lower tiers. Note that
according to Theorem 40(B), in large networks the length of the “entangled motifs” is short.
Therefore, we do not expect to see excessively long structures, but rather small ones, having
just a few ASs.
V. DATA ANALYSIS
In this section we compare our theoretical findings with actual monthly snapshots of the
inter-AS connectivity, reconstructed from BGP update messages [31].
Our model predicts that, for A > cA > 1 , the type-A (“major league”) players will form
a highly connected subset, specifically a clique (Section III-A). The type-B players, in turn,
form structures that are connected to the clique. Figure 12 presents the graph of a subset of the
top 100 ASs per January 2006, according to CAIDA ranking [32]. It is visually clear that the
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inter-connectivity of this subset is high. Indeed, the top 100 ASs graph density, which is the
ratio between the number of links present and the number of possible links, is 0.23, compared
to a mean 0.024 ± 0.004 for a random connected set of 100. It is important to note that we
were able to obtain similar results by ranking the top ASs using topological measures, such as
betweeness, closeness and k-core analysis.
In the dynamic aspect, we expect the type-A players sub-graph to converge to a complete
graph. We evaluate the mean node-to-node distance in this subset as a function of time by
using quarterly snapshots of the AS graph from January, 2006 to October, 2008. Indeed, the
mean distance decreases approximately linearly. The result is presented in Fig. 13(a). Also, the
distance value tends to 1, indicating the almost-completeness of this sub-graph.
Although, in principle, there are many structures the type-B players (“minor players”) may
form, the dynamics we considered indicates the presence of stars and lines mainly (Sections
IV-B and IV-C). While the partition of ASs to just two types is a simplification, we still expect
our model to predict fairly accurately the structures at the limits of high-importance ASs and
marginal ASs. A k-core of a graph is the maximal connected subgraph in which all nodes have
degree of at least k. The k-shell is obtained after the removal of all the k-core nodes. In Fig.
12, a snapshot of the sub-graph of the marginal ASs is presented, using a k-core separation
(k = 3), where all the nodes in the higher cores are removed. The abundance of lines and stars
is visually clear. In addition, the spanning tree of this subset, which consists of 75% of the
ASs in the Internet, is formed by removing just 0.02% of the links in this sub-graph, a strong
indication for a forest-like structure.
For a choice of core C, the node-core distance of a node i /∈ C is defined as the shortest path
from node i to any node in the core. In Section III-A, we showed that, by allowing monetary
transfers, the maximal distance of a type-B player to the type-A clique (the maximal “node-core
distance” in our model) depends inversely on the number of nodes in the clique and the number
of players in general. Likewise, we expect the mean “node-core” distance to depend inversely
on the number of nodes in the clique. The number of ASs increases in time, and we may assume
the number of type-A players follows. Therefore, we expect a decrease of the aforementioned
mean “node-core distance” in time. Fig 13 shows the mean distance of the secondary leading
2000 ASs, ranked 101-2100 in CAIDA ranking, from the set of the top 100 nodes. The distance
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Figure 13. a) In solid blue: the mean distance of an AS in the top 100 ASs CAIDA ranking to all the other top 100 ASs,
from January, 2006 to October, 2008. In dashed green: The mean shortest distance of a secondary AS (ranked 101-2100) from
any top AS (ranked 1-100). b) The ratio of the mean number of disjoint paths connecting a minor player to the core to the
mean degree of a minor player. This ratio is above 0.95, and increases in time, showing that additional links are likely to part
of disjoint paths to the core. This ratio is presented as a function of time from January 2006 to October 2008.
decreases in time, in agreement with our model. Similarly, In Section III-E, we showed that, if
the AS are constrained by survivability requirements, mostly applicable in the intermediate and
top tiers of the Internet, the cycle length connecting a major player to a minor player depends
inversely on the number of major players. The steady decline of the cycle’s length in time is
predicted by our model (see section in [?]) (Fig. 14).
It is widely assumed that the evolvement of the Internet follows a “preferential attachment”
process [4]. According to this process, the probability that a new node will attach to an existing
node is proportional (in some models, up to some power) to the existing node’s degree. An
immediate corollary is that the probability that a new node will connect to any node in a set
of nodes is proportional to the set’s sum of degrees. The sum of degrees of the secondary ASs
set is ~1.9 greater than the sum of degrees in the core, according to the examined data[31].
Therefore, a “preferential attachment” class model predicts that a new node is likely to attach
to the shell rather than to the core. As all the nodes in the shell have a distance of at least one
from the core, the new node’s distance from the core will be at least two. Since the initial mean
“shell-core” distance is ~1.26, a model belonging to the “preferential attachment” class predicts
that the mean distance will be pushed to two, and in general increase over time. However, this
is contradicted by the data that shows (Fig 13) a decrease of the aforementioned distance. The
slope of the latter has the 95% confidence bound of (−3.1 · 10−3,−2.3 · 10−3) hops/month, a
strong indication of a negative trend, in disagreement with the “preferential attachment” model
class. In contrast, this trend is predicted by our model, per the discussion in Section III-D. In
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Figure 14. The mean length of the shortest cycle connecting a major player and a minor player as function of time, from
January 2006 to October 2008. The length decrease as time passes and the network grows, in agreement with our model.
fact, if the Internet is described by a random, power law (“scale free”) network, then the mean
distance should grow as Θ(logN) or Θ(log logN) ([33]). However, experimental observations
shows that the mean distance grows slower than that ([34] ), and it fact it may even be reduced
with the network size, as predicted by our model.
Our analysis showed that in most of the generated topologies, the minor players are organized
in small subgraphs that have direct connection to the Internet core, namely the major players
clique, or the tier-1 subgraph. In order to maintain a reliable connection, in each subgraph there
must be at least two links that connect minor players to the core. Indeed, we have found out
that the ratio between the mean number of disjoint paths from a minor player to the core and
the mean degree of minor players is more than 0.95, and it increases in time (Fig. 13). That is,
almost every outgoing link of a minor player is used to provide it with an additional, disjoint
path to the core. In other words, a player is more likely to establish an additional link, hence
increase its degree, if it supplies it with a new path to the core that does not intersect its current
paths.
In section IV we predicted the ubiquity of two network motifs, the “double star” motif (Fig.
11) and the “entangled cycles” motif (Fig. 11). We define the occurrence of a “double star” motif
as the existence of a connected pair of nodes, each with degree greater than m, designated as the
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centers, such that at least m neighbors of one center are also neighbors of the other center. We
generated random networks according to the Configuration Model (CM), in which each node is
given a number of stubs according to its degree, and stubs are connected uniformly. Then, we
evaluated the mean number of occurrences of this motif in a random CM network with the same
number of nodes and the same degree distribution as the real inter-AS topology. For m = 2, we
have found 28.8K occurrences in the real-world inter-AS topology, whereas the mean number
of occurrences in the random CM network was only 5.8K ± 1.3K instances (the ± indicates
standard deviation). Namely, there are more than four times displays of this subgraph in the
Internet than in a random network with the same degree distribution. Chebyshev’s inequality
provides a bound on the p-value, p < 0.003. This low value indicates that it is highly unlikely
that a random CM network explains the frequent appearance of this network motif. We have
tested the prevalence of this motif with other values of m and the number of occurrences is
consistently a few times more than expected in a random CM network. Our analysis suggests
that reliability considerations is one of the factors leading to the increased number of incidents.
The unexpected prevalence of the “feedback loop”, which is a special case of the “entangled
cycles” motif, was first reported in [30]. The “feedback loop” motif coincides with the "entangled
cycles" motif of length three. In order to further assess our results we tested for the occurrence
frequency of the “entangled cycles” motif of length four. We compared the number of occurrences
of this motif in the real-world Internet graph to the expected number of occurrences in a random
Configuration Model network. While the number of instances of this motif in the Internet graph
was 27.7M , the expected number of occurrences in the random network was only 1.3M±0.8M .
The abundance of this network motif, an order of magnitude greater than expected (p < 0.001, a
relaxed bound based on Chebyshev’s inequality) provides a positive indication to the implications
of survivability requirements.
In summary, we have provided both static and dynamic empirical evidence that conform
with our predictions, suggesting the importance of reliability considerations on the structure and
dynamics of the inter-AS topology.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Does the Internet resembles a clique or a tree? Is it contracting or expanding? Can one
statement be true on one segment of the network while the opposite is correct on a different
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segment? How do reliability requirements affect the topological structure of the Internet? The
game theoretic model presented in this work, while abstracting many details away, focuses on
the essence of the strategical decision-making that ASs perform. It provides answers to such
questions by addressing the different roles ASs play.
Our inherently heterogeneous network formation game is flexible, and may be used in a wide
variety of settings. It allows for many variations and schemes, for example situations in which
failures are frequent or rare, or if monetary transfers are feasible or not.
The static analysis has indicated that in all equilibria, the major players form a clique. Our
model predicts that the major players clique will form a settlement-free interconnection subgraph,
while in major player - minor player contracts transactions will occur, and they will be of a transit
contract type. This observation is supported by the empirical evidence,showing the tight tier-1
subgraph, and the fact these ASs provide transit service to the other ASs. We established the
Price of Reliability, which measures the excess social cost that is required in order to maintain
network survivability in an optimal stable equilibrium. Surprisingly, we showed that it can be
smaller than one, that is, the additional survivability constraints add to the social utility. We have
also showed that reliability requirements have disparate effects on different parts of the network.
While it may support dilution in dense areas, it facilitates edges formation in sparse areas, and
in particular it supports the formation of edges connecting minor players and major players.
We discussed multiple dynamics, which represent different scenarios and playing orders.
The dynamic analysis showed that, when the individual players act selfishly and rationally,
the system will converge to either the optimal configuration or to a state in which the social cost
differs by a negligible amount from the optimal social cost. This is important as a prospective
mechanism design. Furthermore, although a multitude of equilibria exist, the dynamics restrict the
convergence to a limited set.. We also learned that, as the number of major players increase, the
distance of the minor players to the core should decrease. This was also confirmed empirically.
In our dynamic analysis we have found the repetitive appearance of small sub-graphs, or network
motifs, namely the “entangled cycles” motif and the “double star” motif. Indeed, the number of
appearance of these motifs in the real Inter-AS topology surpassed the expected number by a
few times, indicating that additional factors support their formation, and as our analysis shows,
survivability is one of them.
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Finally, while our analysis focuses on the inter-AS topology, it may be applied to other
networks as well, that are composed of heterogeneous, rational agents that are required to
maintain some reliability aspects. Primary examples are trade networks and MVNO operators
in the cellular market.
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Figure 15. The scenario described in Lemma 41. The additional link is dashed in blue.
VII. APPENDIX : PRELIMINARIES
The next lemma will be useful in many instances. It measures the benefit of connecting the
two ends of a long line of players, as presented in 15. If the line is too long, it is better for both
parties at its end to form a link between them.
Lemma 41. Assume of lone line having k nodes, (x1, x2, ...xk). By establishing the link (x1, xk)
the sum of distances
∑
i d(x1, xi) (
∑
d(xk, xi)) is reduced by
k (k − 2) +mod(k, 2)
4
Proof: Without the link (x1, xk) the sum of distances is given by the algebraic series
∑
i
d(x1, xi) =
k−1∑
i=1
i =
k (k − 1)
2
If k is odd, than the the addition of the link (x1, xk) we have
∑
i
d(x1, xi) = 2
bk/2c∑
i=1
i = (bk/2c+ 1) bk/2c
= ((k − 1) /2 + 1) ((k − 1) /2)
=
k2 − 1
4
If k is even, the corresponding sum is
∑
i
d(x1, xi) =
k/2∑
i=1
i+
k/2−1∑
i=1
i
=
(k/2 + 1) k
4
+
(k/2− 1) k
4
=
k2
4
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We conclude that the difference for k even is
k2
4
− k
2
=
k (k − 2)
4
and for odd k is
k2
4
− k
2
+
1
4
=
k (k − 2) + 1
4
